The History of V Corps

On the cover:
"American Troops Advancing" by Harold Brett

The scene is of American doughboys marching into battle in Northern France during World War I, where V Corps was born and fought in the closing months of the "Great War."

The image is one of many pieces of original art prints and posters in the U.S. Army Center of Military History's Army artwork collection. For information on ordering CMH products and publications, go to www.army.mil/cmh-pg/catalog/HowTo.htm

Preface

V Corps soldiers, veterans, and friends:

V Corps has been serving the nation in peace and war since 1918. Organized overseas, in France, in World War I, the Corps has spent most of its organizational life outside of the United States, either committed to battle in the two World Wars or on the front lines of freedom in times of uneasy peace. Today, V Corps remains in Europe, committed to supporting the NATO alliance and to carrying out the national security objectives of the United States.

The Victory Corps distinguished itself in eight campaigns in two World Wars, earning its nickname during the Meuse-Argonne offensive of World War I and validating its reputation for hard, steady fighting at Omaha Beach in June of 1944. The post-war years have been no less demanding, although in a different way. Veterans of Cold War service in V Corps well recall the exquisite state of training of Corps units and the high tension and watchful readiness of those years.

In the course of the last decade, the demands on V Corps have, if anything, increased, as the Corps has learned to deal with world events that remained somewhere between peace and war, and that ranged all across the spectrum of conflict from peace enforcement through combat operations. Constantly involved in operations of one kind or another since 1990, V Corps has done much of the "heavy lifting" for the United States Army in places as widely separated as the Balkans and east Africa.

This short history of the Corps tells the story of Victory Corps soldiers in the 83 years during which they have invariably met the challenge and won success for the nation. We dedicate this history to those who have served in V Corps, who are serving now in V Corps, and who will serve in V Corps in the future.

Victory Corps!

Charles E. Kirkpatrick
V Corps Historian

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V Corps in World War I

I

1918-1919

The AEF is formed

The American Expeditionary Force that went to France in 1917 and 1918 was a sketchily trained army built around a core of fewer than 130,000 pre-war regular soldiers. National Guardsmen called to duty had a solid basis of military training, but the bulk of the AEF consisted of volunteersa and draftees that had never been in uniform before. The United States Army was as inexperienced institutionally as its soldiers were individually. Many regulars and National Guardsmen had recently served on the Mexican border and in the Punitive Expedition into Mexico in pursuit of Francisco "Pancho" Villa, but those operations rarely involved maneuver of units larger than regiments. More often, they were independent troop and squadron patrols and raids.

The Army's other recent combat experience was little more relevant. The Spanish-American War had been brief, and although a Fifth Corps headquarters—a unit that was later disbanded and that had no connection to the V Corps of World War I and afterward—was fielded, the conditions were undemanding by World War I standards. Neither did suppressing guerrilla warfare in the Philippines or securing American interests in China offer many useful lessons for senior commanders. The only general officer in the entire AEF that had commanded even a brigade in battle was Gen. John J. Pershing.

Thus, as the Army went to war, first-hand knowledge about commanding and administering large troop units was a scarce commodity. The Army had briefly experimented with organizing and employing a division in the years between the War with Spain and 1917, but the last significant experience with corps and armies was in the Civil War. Therefore, when General John J. Pershing took the AEF overseas, his senior commanders really had as much to learn about the art of modern war as did the newest soldier.

V Corps organized in France

The nine corps headquarters called for in the General Organization Plan of the AEF were an essential part of Pershing's scheme to build and train an independent American Army in France. Training specific to the European theater of war was necessary not only to teach the soldiers the tactical lessons that the British and French had assimilated over four years of trench warfare, but also to train them in using weapons with which they had no experience. Among other things, the AEF had to learn about the employment of field and heavy artillery and aerial artillery observation techniques; gas warfare; the use of the tank; and such weapons as trench mortars and heavy machine guns.

Furthermore, corps commanders and staffs needed the opportunity to learn how to command divisions that numbered around 28,000 men each. By comparison, French and British divisions were about half as large, and German divisions roughly one-third the size of the American division. After the AEF activated corps headquarters, the first task of each corps was to receive and begin the training of divisions that would get their baptism of fire in a final phase of training in the trenches under British or French command. Only after that training was well advanced, and after Pershing activated First Army to command them, would the corps assume a combat rôle. Ultimately, Pershing's goal was to create the First U.S. Army with five subordinate operational corps, a total of about one million men. He intended each corps to command four combat divisions and control two replacement and training divisions, but that scheme soon proved unworkable, and the corps became a purely combat organization, with replace-



U.S. ARMY PHOTO

V Corps' first commanding general, Maj. Gen. William M. Wright, 1918.

ment and training services handled by the AEF headquarters.

Implementing Pershing's orders, Maj. Gen. William M. Wright organized and activated V Corps headquarters at Remiremont between 7 and 12 July in 1918. Pershing activated First Army a month later, on 10 August, and AEF orders assigned V Corps to First Army on 19 August. The following day, Gen. Wright turned over command of the corps to Maj. Gen. George H. Cameron, who became its first combat commander. Wright enjoyed the unusual distinction of commanding four different corps while in France, overseeing their organization and early training, but of never commanding a corps in battle. In battle, he instead commanded a division, for a while under V Corps control.

The war was a relatively short one for V Corps, spanning the four months from 12 July through the armistice on 11 November 1918. The combat actions encompassed the three campaigns of St. Mihiel, Meuse-Argonne, and Lorraine 1918. In the course of those campaigns, the corps fought two major offensive actions at St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne.

St. Mihiel offensive

Five weeks after its activation, V Corps moved into battle for the first time. On 19 August, the corps relieved a French corps in the trenches along the western side of the St. Mihiel salient in Lorraine. For almost a month, until 10 September, V Corps troops defended their sector without incident, and with comparatively light casualties. The V Corps sector was on the left, or northern, flank of a salient that was 24 miles wide at its base and that extended thirteen miles into allied lines. The salient had changed little in shape in four years, and combined three lines of excellent field fortifications with natural defensive advantages that the Germans had steadily developed throughout the war. An elaborate system of wire entanglements covered defenses that ranged from six to eight miles in depth, and that the French had unsuccessfully attacked several times.

Because Pershing had been interested in the salient almost from the beginning, he had arranged for many American divisions to be assigned to the trenches along its face for their combat seasoning. Thus, although the American divisions could only be characterized as green, they did have some familiarity with the terrain and the conditions they would eventually face in their first major attack. For the offensive, First Army commanded 550,000 Americans and 110,000 French troops in four corps, in what was the first entirely American-planned and -led operation of the war.

IV Corps (1st, 42nd, and 89th Divisions) and I Corps (2nd, 5th, 82nd, and 90th Divisions), on the southern side of the salient, delivered the main attack, with II French Colonial Corps and V Corps (26th Division, 4th Division, and 15th French Colonial Division) making supporting attacks on the western and northern faces, respectively. To increase surprise, Pershing limited the preliminary artillery barrage to four hours, opening fire at 0100 on 12 September. At 0500, the infantry of the main attack jumped off and made good progress, seizing Thiacourt, Nonsard, and Bouillonville, the first-day objectives. At 0800, artillery fire lifted in front of V Corps infantry, which went over the top and made similar progress. By 1900 on the first day, the corps had attained objectives specified for the second day, and the troops pushed on to take terrain beyond Dampierre-aux-Bois and Dommartin by around midnight.

The Germans had naturally observed the preparations for an attack, but did not expect it to be made until the second half of September. Economizing on forces, the German command had planned a withdrawal from the salient and had just begun that withdrawal when the American attacks commenced. Soon, reports of rapidly withdrawing German units flooded in to Pershing's headquarters, and he acted immediately to take advantage of the situation.

Responding to First Army orders, V Corps rushed its 26th Division south through the forests to Vigneulles, where it met troops of the IV Corps' 1st Division about 0600 on 13 September, closing the salient and cutting off the retreat of the Germans to their west. Minor operations to take control of prisoners throughout the area continued until 16 September, when the American units turned over the line to a French corps and redeployed for the next major offensive.



COURTESY *AMERICAN ARMIES AND BATTLEFIELDS IN EUROPE*

The St. Mihiel offensive.

In terms of numbers, the results of the St. Mihiel offensive were impressive. American attacks had eliminated a salient of some 200 square miles, captured 16,000 prisoners, and taken 443 cannon, at a cost of 7,000 casualties to the four allied corps involved. More important than the purely military results, was the fact that elimination of the salient restored use of a number of important railroad links that German occupation of the ground had disrupted. In terms of American battle prowess, however, the results were debatable. The Americans and French outnumbered the German defenders of the salient by a factor of 46 to one. Moreover, the Germans were disorganized and in the process of withdrawing when First Army attacked, and the final line the offensive achieved coincided very nearly with the new defensive line the Germans had intended to occupy after withdrawing from the area. Gen. Hunter Liggett, commanding I Corps, remarked that the "effect on the enemy, our own, and allied morale was all that we had hoped for." He qualified his satisfaction with the results of the battle by adding that "in our pride we should not forget that it had been no even fight." As V Corps marched to its assembly areas for the forthcoming offensive in the Argonne, however, it took with it soldiers who had a successful battle behind them and who had learned the techniques of breaking through elaborately protected trench systems.

Meuse-Argonne offensive

Following the St. Mihiel operation, V Corps moved a short distance to the northwest —the Meuse-Argonne sector — and took up positions near Verdun-sur-Meuse. While the St. Mihiel offensive was an American operation, the Meuse-Argonne attack in which V Corps was about to participate was a general offensive involving both the American and French armies and planned by Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the allied supreme commander. The intention was to push the Germans as far back toward the Rhine River as possible, depleting the German reserves and preparing for the final offensive that Foch considered

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

COURTESY *AMERICAN ARMIES AND BATTLEFIELDS IN EUROPE*

ABOVE: The Meuse-Argonne offensive from 26 September to 4 October 1918.
TOP: Infantrymen from V Corps' 23rd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division, fighting in the Meuse-Argonne.

necessary in the spring of 1919.

The First Army's mission was to attack northeastward between the Argonne Forest and the Meuse River in the direction of Sedan. Foch expected that, even if the Americans did not advance as far as the plan called for, their attack would force the Germans to withdraw troops from other portions of the front to reinforce the Argonne sector. The American attack was also directed against the German lines of communication, and aimed at cutting the two important railways that ran northward from the area around Metz and paralleled the front. Because the Germans used the railroads to move troops laterally along the front and to supply their divisions, Foch believed that cutting the rail lines would inevitably force the German army to withdraw, perhaps as far back as the Rhine.

Appreciating the importance of the area, the German high command laid careful defensive plans that exploited the difficult terrain of the Argonne Forest, where numerous east-west ridges provided strong, natural defensive positions. The Germans organized their defenses into four lines. In their sector, the Americans outnumbered the Germans by about six to one, but the German army had up to 15 full-strength divisions ready to bring forward if necessary. The defenders also had the advantages of carefully prepared positions with good observation and fields of fire.

The attack began on 26 September. A total of 2,700 guns fired an artillery preparation from 0230 through 0530. At

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall, V Corps commander during the Meuse-Argonne offensive, later became Chief of Staff of the Army.

0530, the guns then began to fire a rolling barrage, behind which the infantry followed closely as it advanced into the German defenses. V Corps was the center of the First Army line and commanded three relatively inexperienced divisions, the 92nd, 37th, and 79th. Pershing planned to have I Corps, on the left, and III Corps, to the right, outflank the strong German defenses at Montfaucon, about three miles behind the front line trace. While the other two corps cut the German position off, V Corps was to capture it. First Army would then use the heights at Montfaucon as an artillery position to support the second day's attack through the Hindenburg Line to seize Cunel and Romagne, both towns in the V Corps sector.

While the attack began well, and the two adjacent corps advanced according to plan, V Corps encountered difficulties almost immediately. The corps had only a single road leading to the front to handle all the troop movements and traffic of artillery and support units, a factor that complicated operations. Hitting heavy resistance, the inexperienced divisions could not reach Montfaucon, and that failure retarded the whole First Army plan. The corps finally took its first-day objectives on day three of the attack, primarily as a result of the brilliant fighting of the 91st Division, but the slow pace of the advance gave the Germans time to bring reinforcements up to the front, with six infantry divisions arriving by 28 September to bolster the defenses. Although an unfortunate development for First Army, that fulfilled part of Foch's intent of drawing German troops away from other portions of the line.

After a brief pause, during which V Corps rotated its divisions out of the line and received the veteran 1st, 3rd, and 32nd Divisions, with the 42nd Division in corps reserve, the attack resumed on 4 October. The attack went well for the first four days, with V Corps advancing toward Romagne in coordination with III Corps, but again the pace slowed, and Foch ordered another pause on 11 October. At that point, Pershing replaced Cameron with Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall as corps commander and reshuffled divisions, giving V Corps the experienced 42nd and 32nd Divisions, with the 89th Division as a reserve.

COURTESY WORLD WAR I PHOTO ARCHIVE



U.S. ARMY PHOTO

ABOVE: V Corps logistical trains during the Meuse-Argonne offensive.
LEFT: Renault light tanks supported the V Corps attack in the Meuse-Argonne.

Summerall was the right choice to command the corps at a difficult moment. An artillery officer with a considerable reputation for innovation and aggressiveness, Summerall had previously commanded the 1st Field Artillery Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division in the first American attack of the war at Cantigny, in the summer of 1918, and then had commanded the 1st Infantry Division. Disdainful of enemy fire himself, he expected similar behavior of his commanders and staff and was quick to relieve any officer he saw as incompetent, hesitant or shy under fire. Summerall had developed infantry-artillery coordination to a fine art, within the limitations of the communications available in 1918, and had already demonstrated that he was one of the most brilliant tactical commanders in the AEF. When he took command, Summerall promptly reorganized the artillery support corps provided the infantry divisions, and the next attack on 21 October overran the German defenses around Cunel and broke the third German defensive line, the Kriemhilde Stellung. First Army was at that point poised to attack the final German line.

The final phase of the offensive began on 1 November. V Corps launched the 89th Division and the seasoned 1st and 2nd Divisions toward the Freya Stellung, the final German defenses before Sedan, and broke through by noon. The German army began a general withdrawal with the Americans in close pursuit. On the night of 6 to 7 November, 1st Division of V Corps captured the heights in front of Sedan, opening the way for the XVII French Corps to capture the city. During the morning of 8 November, the corps began crossing the Meuse River and continued to advance until the cessation of hostilities on 11 November.

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

A monument honoring V Corps soldiers who fought and died in France during World War I was erected near Mouzon, France in November 1918. The monument, later damaged by fighting in World War II, was rebuilt and rededicated in 2001.

End of the war and return to the United States

Throughout the war, V Corps operated under close control of First Army and suffered its due proportion of that Army's 117,000 casualties. Some allied observers commented that Americans took undue losses because they did not properly learn their tactical lessons from the British and French. Criticisms notwithstanding, the corps emerged from World War I with the appellation "Victory Corps," in recognition of its hard fighting and the rapid advances it made during the last phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive. In the years between the two World Wars, professional soldiers carefully studied the problems American forces encountered in 1918, however, and one result of the AEF experience was that a small, but influential number of officers laid the groundwork for the mechanized and armored style of war that the U.S. Army waged between 1942 and 1945.

Officers assigned to V Corps had some personal experience that helped them to understand later developments in the mechanization of military forces. In both the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives, V Corps attacks were supported by American armored battalions commanded by then-Col. George S. Patton. Summerall's practice of sending howitzers forward to support the assault troops presaged the development of motorized artillery to accompany the infantry. Especially in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, V Corps leaders learned something about developing plans that included tactical air support from the new Air Service. Finally, mobile antiaircraft artillery, a new arm of service developed in 1918, accompanied V Corps units and protected river crossings, artillery, supply depots, and headquarters from German air attack.

Another important aspect of the American experience in World War I was that officers gained some understanding of the cost of modern warfare and time needed to develop the industrial base for

total war. The War Department General Staff estimated that World War I had cost the United States an average of $1 million per hour for the 25 months of mobilization, fighting, and immediate post-war occupation duty. Staff officers learned to think differently about costs, since pay for officers and men accounted for only 13 percent of that total of $22 billion, an amount equivalent to the costs of operating the United States government for the entire period from 1791 through 1914.

At the individual level, many of the officers who commanded V Corps and its subordinate divisions during World War II gained their battle experience in France, many of them in V Corps, during the First World War. Two of those men were particularly significant. Clarence R. Huebner stood out as one of the best combat leaders in the AEF. Enlisted for six years in the 18th Infantry before the war, Huebner obtained a commission and commanded at every level in the 26th Infantry from platoon through regiment. At the front from November 1917 through the end of the war, Huebner fought in every major action and was decorated with two Distinguished Service Crosses for valor and the Distinguished Service Medal for leadership. He was twice wounded in action. A temporary lieutenant colonel at the end of the war, Huebner outranked all of his contemporaries commissioned in 1917. Leonard T. Gerow, six years Huebner's senior, did not have the opportunity to command in battle during World War I. Instead, he served on the staff of the AEF. Despite having no opportunity for distinction, he also reached the temporary rank of lieutenant colonel. Later becoming one of the Army's foremost staff officers, Gerow became chief of the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff immediately before the Second World War. During World War II, those two officers commanded V Corps.

Many other officers who later commanded divisions under V Corps control in World War II had their first taste of battle in World War I as well. John Leonard, who commanded the 9th Armored Division, was an infantryman who had marched into Mexico with the 6th Infantry in the Punitive Expedition of 1916 and who commanded the 3rd Battalion of that regiment in the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne battles, earning a Distinguished Service Cross and being wounded in action. Edward Brooks, who commanded the 2nd Armored Division, served in the 76th Field Artillery in World War I and was also decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross. Louis Craig commanded 9th Infantry Division. In World War I, he served both in the line and on division, corps, and army staffs, took part in four campaigns and earned foreign awards that included the British Distinguished Service Order, the French Chevalier of the Legion of Honor and Croix de Guerre with Palm, and the Belgian Order of the Crown of Leopold and Croix de Guerre. Charles Helmick commanded V Corps Artillery in World War II, including the decisive action at the Battle of the Bulge, where Corps Artillery orchestrated the fires of 37 field artillery battalions at Elsenborn Ridge. In World War I, he commanded Battery B, 15th Field Artillery, was later regimental executive officer, fought on the Marne and at Soissons, and won two Silver Stars. Paul Baade commanded the 35th Infantry Division in World War II. In the First World War, he was a company commander in the 332nd Infantry of the 81st Infantry Division in the last months of the war. Charles Gerhardt commanded 29th Infantry Division during the assault on Normandy in World War II. He went to France in 1918 with the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, and was at the front as aide-de-camp to Maj. Gen. William M. Wright in V Corps, VII Corps, and in the 89th Infantry Division. Robert Hasbrouck, who commanded 7th Armored Division, went to France in 1918 with the 62nd Coast Artillery. Leland Hobbs, who commanded the workhorse, and very successful, 30th Infantry Division, arrived in France in 1918 with the 11th Infantry Division just in time for the armistice.

V Corps remained in Europe from the armistice through March 1919, responsible for training the divisions that were to serve in the American Third Army, assigned to occupation duty in the Rhineland. In March, the corps stood down, as the Army inactivated all its corps headquarters, and on 2 May, V Corps was demobilized at Camp Funston, Kansas. Two years later, on 29 July 1921, V Corps was among the headquarters reconstituted as inactive units in the Army Reserve. The corps was briefly active at Fort Thomas, Kentucky, from 17 February 1922 through 15 November 1924, and then remained in the active reserves. On 1 October 1933, the War Department allotted V Corps to the Regular Army, although the headquarters remained on the inactive list in the tiny interwar service.

II

1940-1944

REACTIVATION AND EMPLOYMENT

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

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ABOVE: Louisiana Maneuvers, 1941.
TOP: Camp Beauregard, Louisiana, V Corps headquarters in 1940 and 1941.

Reactivation of V Corps

V Corps reentered the active rolls of the Army because of the growing threat of war. During the two years between the German invasion of Poland in September 1939 and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Army conducted a partial mobilization to prepare itself for the war many feared would eventually involve the United States. By the summer of 1940, the German army's rapid conquest of France and the German Luftwaffe's aerial assault on the United Kingdom heightened concerns about American preparedness. Congressional reluctance to institute a peacetime daft was overcome in August when the summer encampments of the National Guard revealed many deficiencies in what was theoretically a combat-ready force.

As the Army gradually expanded through the working of the newly enacted Selective Service law and through bringing the National Guard under federal command, additional headquarters became necessary to train the growing number of troops. When he became chief of staff of General Headquarters of the Army, Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair immediately recommended, and then supervised, the activation of additional field armies and corps to train the draftees and National Guardsmen inducted into federal service. Thus, War Department general orders activated V Corps at Camp Beauregard, near Alexandria, Louisiana, on 20 October 1940, and assigned it to Third U.S. Army, then under command of Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger.

the louisiana maneuvers

Throughout the winter and spring of

1940-1941, Maj. Gen. Campbell B. Hodges' new corps supervised the training of the 32nd, 34th, 37th, and 38th Infantry Divisions, all National Guard units, conducting numerous small exercises and then maneuver with larger formations as the regiments and divisions gradually became more tactically proficient. In March 1941, Hodges retired from active duty and handed over command to Maj. Gen. Edmund L. Daley. In one of his first acts after assuming command, Daley gave the corps its motto, *"It will be done!"* In selecting the motto, Daley intended to emphasize that V Corps would routinely carry out the most difficult of missions as a matter of course.

The culmination of the corps' pre-war training came during the General Headquarters Maneuvers of 1941, which pitted Krueger's Third Army against Lt. Gen. Ben Lear's Second Army. The 1941 maneuvers, involving more than 472,000 soldiers, were the largest that the Army had ever conducted to that time. Gen. George C. Marshall, Army chief of staff, called them a "combat college for troop leading," and announced that he preferred for mistakes to be made in maneuvers, rather than in battle. As events turned out, the maneuvers fulfilled Marshall's expectations about mistakes, but they also gave the Army a chance to test both its tactical assumptions and the abilities of its recently promoted young majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels as tactical commanders.

While other units were arriving in Louisiana, Krueger took his Third Army to the field for a final round of corps training, maneuvering V Corps and VIII Corps against IV Corps to practice the battle he expected against Lear's Second Army. Then he marched his 10 divisions into the assembly area to the north of Lake Charles. The maneuvers themselves were a triumph for Third Army and for the man generally credited with devising its plan for battle, then-Col. Dwight D. Eisenhower. During Phase I (15 to 18 September), V Corps was the pivot upon which Krueger maneuvered IV and VIII Corps in an attempt to trap Second Army against the Red River between Natchitoches and Alexandria.

The corps, commanding the 32nd, 34th, and 37th Divisions and the 106th Cavalry Regiment, made a textbook advance to seize crossings over the Red River and then turned to march further north as Krueger modified his plan to allow for Second Army's deployments. In Phase II (21 to 29 September), the corps confronted Second Army's VII Corps while the 2nd Armored, 2nd Infantry, and 1st Cavalry Divisions enveloped the left flank of Second Army, establishing the reputations both of the 2nd Armored Division and of its commander, George S. Patton.

A plodding infantry organization when compared to the few, and highly publicized, new mechanized and armored units, V Corps had no such moments of distinction, but the maneuvers were nonetheless important to the corps, both as tests of its capabilities and as training for its leaders and soldiers. Unfortunately, many of those benefits were short-lived. Before long, Marshall decided to replace both senior commanders—some 31 generals in the two armies—and many overage company and field grade officers, particularly in the National Guard divisions, with younger men. Nor did the divisions themselves benefit from the increased proficiency the maneuvers produced, because they were later dismembered to provide the cadres for a rapidly expanding wartime Army.

Instead, the point of the General Headquarters Maneuvers was that they set the pattern for operations that the corps would follow throughout World War II: maneuver with infantry-artillery teams supported by independent tank battalions. The other important aspect of the maneuvers was that they allowed the Army to begin to come to grips with those technical aspects of modern warfare that had appeared, but that had really not been developed, during World War I or the succeeding peacetime years: the use of armored forces, the tactical use of air forces, and the organization of antitank units. When the maneuvers ended, the corps returned to Camp Beauregard, where it was still involved with training divisions at the time of Pearl Harbor.

"It Will Be Done!"

When Maj. Gen. Edmund L. Daley assumed command of V Corps in March 1941, he wanted a motto for the corps that stressed that V Corps would carry out the most difficult missioins as a matter of course. His slogan: "It Will Be Done!"


U.S. ARMY PHOTO

The motto has been incorporated into the V corps crest, approved in 1969 for wear by members of the corps.

The design is based upon the authorized sleeve insignia for V Corps. The first "demi fleur-de-lis" capping the design represents France, where the corps was activated in 1918. The three stars commemorate the Lorraine, St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne campaigns the corps fought in during World War I.

The second fleur-de-lis represents World War II. The five radial lines represent the Central Europe, Ardennes-Alsace, Rhineland, Northern France and Normandy campaigns, with the line capped by the arrowhead symbolizing the assault landing at Normandy.

Deployment to the European theater

Immediately upon declaration of war in December 1941, the War Department selected V Corps to become a headquarters dubbed magnet force, and ordered it to Northern Ireland with the two-fold mission of receiving American units as they were sent to the United Kingdom and helping the British prepare for defense against invasion. Advance elements of the corps headquarters left the United States on 10 January 1942 and established a command post in Belfast on 23 January. By 3 March, the first troop units began arriving as the 34th Infantry Division and the 107th Engineer Battalion debarked. Daley was retired from the Army at the same time the movement orders were issued, and Maj. Gen. William S. Key took command briefly during the period of overseas movement. Maj. Gen. Russell P. Hartle assumed command in Ireland on 20 May 1942.

It soon became clear that there was no longer any serious threat of a German invasion of the British Isles, and the corps concentrated on receiving and training troops. Besides the 34th Infantry Division, V Corps supervised training of the 1st Armored Division, which arrived in Ireland in June, 1942. The corps became a testing ground for the development of less conventional forces as well. Impressed with the capabilities of British commando units and seeing a need for similar forces, the War Department authorized Maj. William O. Darby to organize the 1st Ranger Battalion from V Corps volunteers. In November, 1942, when II Corps left England to take part in the North African campaign, the 1st Armored and 34th Infantry Divisions went with it. V Corps remained behind as the senior U.S. Army tactical formation in the United Kingdom and moved its headquarters from Brownlow House, Lurgan, in Northern Ireland, to Clifton College near Bristol, England.

Once in England, the corps continued to receive and train units for eventual combat in Europe, including the 29th Infantry Division from the United States and the 5th Infantry Division, which arrived from a brief tour of duty in Iceland. On 15 July 1943, Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow assumed command of the corps and moved the headquarters to Norton Manor Camp near Taunton in Somerset, where the corps became a part of First U.S. Army.

Slated to take part in the eventual landings in France that were the keystone of American strategy for the war, V Corps was also a part of the operational planning process for the assault. Starting in June, 1943, the corps carried out Operation Wadham, a deception that involved planning and training for early landings on the Brest peninsula in France. The purpose of Wadham, which was part of a larger diversionary plan, was to pin down German divisions in France by threatening landings before the end of 1943. Various parts of Wadham eventually became part of the overlord plan for the Normandy invasion. Through it, the Allies learned something about how many divisions could be mounted through the British coastal ports

U.S. ARMY PHOTO


U.S. ARMY PHOTO

LEFT: V Corps headquarters on board the *RMS Queen Mary* en route to Europe in January 1942.
ABOVE: V Corps troops disembarking in Ireland in January 1942, the first American troops in the European Theater.

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

V Corps' Exercise Atlantic with M-3 Grant tanks in Ireland, 1942.

for an invasion, and identified most of the logistical problems that an invading force would encounter. Meanwhile, the corps continued to train its divisions in amphibious techniques.

To iron out problems discovered during the planning for Wadham and to test various concepts for landing troops over beaches, the corps conducted the first amphibious exercise, Duck, at Slapton Sands on England's south coast in December 1943 and January 1944, landing 29th Infantry Division troops in a test of equipment, embarkation procedures, and assault techniques. The landing exercises refined the techniques corps troops would use in Neptune, the First Army portion of Operation Overlord.

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

Training for the invasion of Normandy with M-4 Sherman tanks at England's Wollacombe Training Center, 1943.

III

1944-1946

The War In Europe



COURTESY U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY ARMY ARTWORK COLLECTION

"On the Way to the Assault Boats," original painting by Olin Dows, 1944. The troops the artist depicts moving into the English surf could well be V Corps soldiers, who played an integral part in Operation Overlord.

On June 6, 1944, V Corps entered battle in France. Before World War II ended 11 months and three days later, the corps saw 338 days of continuous combat and advanced roughly 1,300 miles from Normandy to Czechoslovakia in the course of five hard-fought campaigns.

The Normandy landings and the fight for northern France

At 0415 on the morning of June 6, V Corps troops sat in landing craft that lay 10 miles off the Normandy beaches, awaiting the dawn. At 0630, local time, "Force O," soldiers from the 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions under command of Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, commander of the Big Red One, began wading through the surf on a beach code-named Omaha. It was a hard fight from the very beginning. Expecting to find only a single German regiment defending the beach, the assault troops were instead confronted by major elements of the 352nd Infantry Division that had come through the preliminary aerial and naval gunfire bombardment with little damage to its prepared defenses on the bluffs above the shore. Heavy seas and bad weather complicated landings for the 34,142 soldiers and 3,306 vehicles of the initial assault wave. Almost three-fourths of the assault vehicles and artillery were lost when landing craft capsized or foundered, and nearly all of the amphibious (Duplex Drive) M4 Sherman tanks launched 6,000 yards out failed to reach the shore. Those tanks that Army and Navy commanders on the spot decided to land directly on the beach, rather than launching at sea, suffered heavy losses in

the opening minutes of the assault.

Soldiers struggled through heavy surf and then across 200 to 300 yards of open, mined beach, and then found themselves pinned down behind a seawall or, further down the beach, a line of dunes, by unexpectedly heavy fire. Eventually, they also discovered that virtually every unit had landed in the wrong place, and that their carefully prepared assault plans, thoroughly rehearsed against terrain models in England, were worthless. When "Force B," under Maj. Gen. Charles H. Gerhard, commander of the 29th Infantry Division, began landing its 25,117 men of the follow-on waves, most of the first two attack waves were still at the water's edge, having taken heavy casualties among officers and non-commissioned officers.

Desperate for information, Gerow, then aboard the command ship U.S.S. Ancon, dispatched his Assistant Chief of Staff, Col. Benjamin B. Talley, to find out what was happening on the beach. Talley embarked on an amphibious truck, a DUKW, and with a detachment of troops spent several hours cruising back and forth some 500 yards off Omaha beach, ultimately landing there to serve as a liaison officer between elements of the 1st Infantry Division and the corps commander. At first impression, the situation was a disaster, with the assault evidently stopped and follow-on boats milling about offshore. Talley, later decorated with a Distinguished Service Cross for his actions on D-Day, was eventually able to report to an anxious Gerow and Huebner that the corps attack was making its way inland, but not before several anxious hours had passed.

Omaha turned out to be the most tenaciously defended of the invasion beaches, and the site of the bloodiest fighting. Around noon, Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley, First Army commander, feared that the landings on Omaha had failed and seriously considered evacuating the beach. By the time that decision had to be made, however, the movement off the beach that Talley had observed had finally begun to retrieve the situation. Leaders of every rank began to collect groups of soldiers together and took them up the bluffs, where they assaulted the German defenses from the rear and thus, at last, began to establish a beachhead. Gerow revised the landing schedule for follow-on waves of troops to reinforce those portions of the shore where progress was possible and coordinated naval gunfire to support the assaults to take the five draws that led away from the invasion beach.

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

U.S. ARMY PHOTO



U.S. ARMY PHOTO

ABOVE: Soldiers from the 1st Infantry Division's Company E, 16th Infantry assault Normandy's Omaha Beach under V Corps command on 6 June 1944.
TOP RIGHT: Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner commanded the Big Red One during the invasion at Normandy. Huebner rose from the rank of sergeant in 1916 to command a battalion of the 1st Infantry Division's 26th Infantry. Huebner went on to assume command of V Corps in January 1945 and lead it through the end of World War II in Europe.
BOTTOM RIGHT: Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow was V Corps commander on D-Day and through the Battle of the Bulge. A friend of Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, Gerow was acknowledged as one of the Army's best and brightest. A consummate infantryman, he led the corps through some of the toughest fights of World War II.

U.S. ARMY

V Corps operations in World War II stretched from England to Czechoslavakia.

"Thank God for the Navy," Gerow told Bradley, reporting that destroyers had literally sailed into the surf as little as 800 yards from the beach to fire directly at bunkers and machine gun positions that were holding up the attack. By mid-day, valor and leadership at all levels had resolved a dangerous situation. In the early afternoon, the corps beachhead and all five exits from the beach were secured and weary soldiers had begun to move inland. That afternoon, the corps established its first command post in Europe five hundred yards from the front line just below the bluffs along the beach at Le Rouquet. The first day of war had been a sobering one. In 15 hours of combat, V Corps had taken approximately 2,500 casualties.

The corps landed the remainder of the two assault divisions and the 2nd Infantry and 2nd Armored Divisions over the succeeding days. During the next two weeks, the corps gradually expanded its shallow lodgment on the Norman coast, taking the fighting into the hedgerow country behind the beaches. A belt of land averaging 50 miles in depth, the hedgerows, or bocage, consisted of a seemingly endless series of interlocked fields, each bounded by earthen berms on which shrubbery and trees grew thickly. The fields were natural forts that gave the Germans enormous defensive advantages and denied the allies the use of their single most important advantage — mobility. The fighting was extremely costly, and V Corps suffered another 3,300 casualties before the hedgerows were behind it. By 11 June, the corps had finally reached its D-Day objectives, and two days later occupied an eight-kilometer front that lay 30 kilometers inland from the shore. Defensive operations consumed the next two weeks as the Allies brought sufficient supplies and ammunition ashore to support a general attack.

Breakout and the race across France

First Army's plan to break out of the lodgment area was Operation Cobra, a 25 July attack by VII and XIX Corps that shattered the German defenses at the town of St. Lô and passed infantry and armored columns through the gap and out of the Brittany peninsula. Once clear of the bocage country, the spearheads turned east toward Paris, rapidly encircling portions of two German armies in what became known as the Falaise-Argentan pocket.

V Corps, which had been holding on the left flank of the breakthrough, received orders to help close the trap at the town of Coutances. In four days of heavy fighting between 17 and 21 August, the corps cooperated with British and Canadian units to prevent the Germans from escaping to the east. Although the pocket was closed too late to encircle all the enemy that had originally been in the vicinity of Falaise, the corps ultimately captured elements of six armored and seven infantry divisions, a total of more than 40,000 prisoners. The battles around the Falaise Gap marked the end of German resistance west of the Seine River. The road to Paris was open, and First Army ordered V Corps to liberate the city.

On 25 August, the 2nd French Armored Division, the 4th Infantry Division, and the 102nd Cavalry Group captured Paris without firing a shot. While the French troops assumed control of the city, the 4th Infantry Division marched through to secure crossings over the river Seine to the south. On 30 August, the corps provided troops for a formal victory parade, marching the 28th Infantry Division down the Champs Élysées, through the city, and directly into

assembly areas to the north of the suburbs to continue the pursuit, joining other units of the corps that had attacked the day before.

On 29 August, V Corps marched on in the direction of Sedan, joining in the race across France that brought U.S. forces to the borders of Germany by the end of September. One week after leaving Paris, and 26 years after its previous visit there, V Corps captured Sedan. Three days later, it liberated the city of Luxembourg, and on 10 September, although the advance was considerably slowed by shortages of gasoline, the corps closed on the German border. Lt. Gen. Courtney Hodges, the First Army commander, gave V Corps permission to conduct a reconnaissance in force, and Gerow sent the 4th and 28th Infantry Divisions, the 5th Armored Division, and the 102nd Cavalry Group forward to attack the Siegfried Line. In the early evening of 11 September, the 85th Reconnaissance Squadron of the 5th Armored Division sent a dismounted patrol into Germany itself, in the vicinity of the town of Wallendorf. The 85th Recon was therefore the first allied unit to enter Germany.

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

ABOVE: A V Corps infantryman during the battle of the Huertgen Forest.
TOP: V Corps infantry used direct fire from 155-mm self-propelled howitzers such as this to crack open German pillboxes on the Siegfried Line in 1944 and early 1945.

The Siegfried Line campaign and the Battle of the Bulge

Anticipating that the Germans would resist fiercely on the Rhine River line, the Allies planned a two-pronged attack that would cross the river north of Koblenz and south of Mainz, setting up the conditions necessary to take the industrial Ruhr valley. The V Corps mission was to move through the frontier fortifications and seize key terrain in the vicinity of Aachen, and particularly the dams over the Roer River, as part of the First Army attack into the Siegfried Line and the Huertgen Forest. The corps sector was 42 miles in width, extending from St. Vith in the south to the vicinity of the city of Luxembourg in the north. When the attacks began on 14 September, Hodges, the First Army commander, also directed V Corps to protect the flank of VII Corps, which was leading the First Army attack into Germany.

The Siegfried Line, constructed before the German attack on France in 1940 as the Westwall, was not as formidable a barrier as it had once been. Many of its guns had been removed and emplaced on the Atlantic and Channel coasts of France, and the fortifications themselves had fallen into disuse over the intervening years. Still, the Germans rapidly moved troops in to reoccupy the defenses, and the corps could count on facing prepared concrete pillboxes and sophisticated antitank barriers known as "dragon's teeth," fields of concrete pyramids as much as two meters in height. Furthermore, the Germans had sown extensive minefields, particularly of the dreaded S-mines and "Schuh" mines, some of which had too little metal to react to minesweeping devices. Again, the infantry-artillery cooperation that had been a hallmark of V Corps operations in World War I and that had been emphasized during the Louisiana Maneuvers, offered a solution to cracking the Siegfried Line. The artillery brought up 155-mm self-propelled howitzers and fired them directly at the pillboxes the infantry had identified. At a rate of one shell, one pillbox, V Corps gradually opened a way through the German defenses. After two weeks of intense fighting, V Corps broke through the Siegfried Line in its sector.

Then, on 29 September, Gerow received orders to suspend his attack, turn his sector over to VIII Corps, and break through another section of the Siegfried Line on a narrow front of 12 miles near Monschau, Belgium, with the objective of reaching the German town of Schleiden and continuing toward the Roer dams.

By that time, the Germans had heavily reinforced their defenses, and V Corps could make little progress. Operations were temporarily suspended during the month (17 September through 16 October) that the 1st Allied Airborne Army and British XXX Corps tried to cross the Rhine at Arnhem, Holland, in Operation Market Garden. On 2 November, with the weather by then considerably harsher, V Corps resumed its attack, sending its 28th Infantry Division into the dense Huertgen Forest to seize the key terrain around Vossenack and Schmidt. Later acknowledging the attack to have been a mistake, Gen. Omar Bradley characterized it as some of the toughest fighting in the European theater. Although the 28th Infantry Division met with early success, the corps was unable to make good use of armor and tactical air support. Heavy German counterattacks through 20 November pushed the division out of Schmidt and the surrounding villages, inflicting losses of more than 6,000 men killed, wounded, and missing, in one of the most costly actions of the entire war. Although a failure, the attack on Schmidt did have a positive aspect, in that it relieved pressure on the VII Corps front, from which the Germans withdrew units to meet the 28th Division's attack.

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

Soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division road march near Buetgenbach, Belgium during the Battle of the Bulge.

Worse fighting was yet to come, as First Army directed V Corps to support the VII Corps attack deeper into the Huertgen Forest. On 21 November, the corps began an attack that was even costlier in terms of casualties than the debacle at Schmidt, but which was more successful. Fighting in bad weather and dense forests, the corps captured Huertgen and progressed in the direction of the Roer River by the 27th of the month. Controlling the ridge overlooking the Roer valley by 7 December, V Corps began an attack with four divisions abreast four days later. The 99th, 2nd, 8th, and 78th Divisions were making good progress when the German counterattack in the Ardennes brought allied offensive operations to a halt.

Beginning on 16 December, the Battle of the Bulge, one of the greatest and certainly most decisive battles of World War II, was also the single greatest battle that the United States Army fought at any time in the entire war. In it, the Army reached maturity. The judgment of Hugh Cole, who wrote the definitive official history of the battle, continues to ring true today. In the Ardennes, he wrote, "the mettle of the American soldier was tested in the fires of adversity and the quality of his response earned for him the right to stand shoulder to shoulder with his forebears of Valley Forge, Fredericksburg, and the Marne."

It was not just the success of the Army as an institution that sustained Cole's evaluation. Above all, it was the fact that the great battle was won by American soldiers in small groups, often isolated and usually without knowing the overall situation, who fought tenaciously, with enormous determination and great courage, in the face of odds that almost always appeared overwhelming. Obstinately, the American soldier fought on when there seemed to be no hope, and his stand in the Ardennes confounded Hitler's hopes and the plans of the German high command in Germany's last, desperate bid to win the war.

The weight of the German offensive, which had been prepared in great secrecy and with exceptionally good operational security, fell in the VIII Corps sector, although a secondary thrust threatened the inexperienced 99th Infantry Division of V Corps. Gerow ordered a tactical withdrawal, and the 99th Division slowly pulled back about 12 miles to the vicinity of Monschau, where it established defensive positions along Elsenborn Ridge with the other three divisions, right

at the boundary with VIII Corps. The German Sixth Panzer Army, attacking on a front 15 miles wide, rapidly gained success on its left flank, with divisions advancing 30 miles from the starting line, but was stopped early by the tough American defense at Monshau, on its right flank. The artillery at Monschau literally stopped a German attack by itself, and in the V Corps sector, the 99th Infantry Division Artillery helped that green unit to hold its ground for two days, until the V Corps artillery on Elsenborn Ridge began to carry the burden. The weight of fire was tremendous: on the night of 17 December, for example, one V Corps infantry battalion was covered by a defensive barrage of 11,500 rounds. By the end of the Battle of the Bulge, V Corps Artillery controlled 37 field artillery battalions behind Elsenborn Ridge. With the stand of V Corps at the twin villages of Krinkelt and Rocherath and along Elsenborn Ridge, the entire German attack fizzled out. Thereafter, the German center of gravity shifted away from the crucial roads that the V Corps defense had denied the attackers and focused on the only remaining alternative, Bastogne.

While the dramatic events of the siege and relief of Bastogne were unfolding further to the south, V Corps secured the northern shoulder of the Bulge against continuous German attacks. In the course of four weeks of fighting, the corps held its ground, so restricting the width of the front that the Germans could use only one Panzer army, instead of two, and disrupting the delicate timetable of the enemy advance. The cost of success was high, though, with V Corps casualties for the Battle of the Bulge amounting to almost 8,000 in its four divisions.

Gerow left the corps to assume command of Fifteenth Army on 15 January 1945, and Huebner, until then in command of the 1st Infantry Division, succeeded him as corps commander just as it became clear that the German counteroffensive was over. In the following two weeks, the corps resupplied and reorganized itself to resume its attacks into Germany. In the center of the line for the general offensive that began on 30 January, V Corps pushed through the Siegfried Line recaptured terrain it had been forced to give up a month earlier. Fighting in deep snow and difficult terrain, the corps once again marched in the direction of Schmidt and the Roer River dams, finally taking the town on 5 February and securing the last of the dams late on 9 February.

The Rhineland and Central Europe campaigns

With the capture of the Roer River dams, the way was open for VII Corps to move on into Germany and for the First Army to close on the Rhine. Because the Germans had committed the bulk of their reserves to their Ardennes offensive, only limited force was available to resist the allied attacks of the late winter and early spring. V Corps marched toward the Rhine on 10 March and spent the next 12 days supporting III Corps as it built and extended its bridgehead over the Rhine at Remagen. Then the corps crossed the river and pushed out of the bridgehead, swinging north along the eastern bank of the river to capture the town of Limburg by 26 March and the city of Koblenz and its fortress of Ehrenbreitstein the next day. Following up those successes, the corps continued to drive up the Lahn River, capturing Fritzlar on 31 March and Gießen on the first of April. Arriving in Kassel on 5 April, the corps received orders to push on into eastern Germany and meet the Russians near Leipzig.

The corps captured Leipzig on 19 April and elements of the 69th Infantry division met Russian troops on the Elbe River near Torgau on 25 April. Responding to First Army orders, the corps again turned over its sector to VII Corps and on 29 April moved into Czechoslovakia, where it fought under Third Army control. On 6 May, V Corps took Pilsen and, three days later, on the last day of the war, accepted the surrender of representatives of the German high command in Czechoslovakia and escorted them to surrender ceremonies. The last bullet to be fired by V Corps in the war against Germany was expended by a rifleman in the 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry, of the 1st Infantry Division, at 0908 in the morning of 8 May.

During World War II, V Corps established and held the Normandy beachhead, helped to make possible the breakthrough at St. Lô, effected a junction with the British and Canadian forces to close the Falaise-Argentan pocket, liberated Paris and marched quickly through northern France, Belgium, and Luxembourg, to be the first allied unit to enter Germany. The corps breached the Siegfried Line in three places, held firm against the German attack in the Battle of the Bulge, crossed the Rhine River, and advanced to Leipzig, making the first junction with the Russian Army. In addition to offensive operations that covered more than 1,300 miles, the corps established command posts in 39 different locations and directed the operations of 25 different divisions. By the end of the war, modifying its motto to suit the circumstances, V Corps was justified in reporting to First Army that "It *has* been done!"

After the cessation of hostilities, the corps began executing its portion of Operation Eclipse, a plan than called for units to retain possession of the areas they occupied at the end of the fighting and disarm the remainder of the German armed forces. In accordance with instructions, the corps simply discharged most German enlisted soldiers in its custody and arranged for their transportation to their homes. In addition, the corps undertook the evacuation of recovered allied prisoners of war, evacuating American, British, French, and Dutch military personnel from camps in Czechoslovakia. In March, 1946, V Corps received orders to return to the United States.

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

The Victor Bridge over the Rhine erected by V Corps engineers. At the time it was the longest tactical bridge in the world.

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

ABOVE: A sign that the end of the war in Europe was approaching. Soldiers of V Corps' 69th Infantry Division met the Russians at Torgau, on the Elbe River, on 25 April 1945.
TOP: V Corps soldiers escorted members of the German high command from Prague, Czechoslavakia to deliver the terms of Germany's surrender in May 1945.

IV

1946-1990

V Corps During the Cold War

The Fort Bragg interlude

The great demobilization following World War II swiftly returned most of the wartime Army to civilian life. In 1946, V Corps left the European theater and was stationed at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, soon moving to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where it quickly become one of the few organizations of its size that remained on the active rolls. Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge assumed command of the post and of a much smaller corps than European veterans remembered; the only maneuver unit was the 82nd Airborne Division.

The Army charged V Corps with the mission of preparing and modifying contingency plans, but the headquarters spent the majority of its time and effort in inspecting units of the General Reserve throughout the country; training units of the reserve, civilian components, and West Point cadets; preparing to activate or build up any active force units that Third U.S. Army, the corps' superior headquarters, might direct; and training units assigned to the corps itself.

Because of drastic reductions in the Army's budget and the general demobilization, much of the corps' mission actually concerned itself with planning, rather than doing. Inasmuch as the 82nd Airborne Division was virtually the only combat-ready and deployable force within the continental United States at the time, available training money and resources went chiefly to maintain that unit's proficiency. Across the corps, personnel shortages plagued tactical and support units alike and hampered training and readiness. The corps commander complained of being hobbled with an excessively large number of soldiers that had low Army General Classification Test scores, and many more that had bad Army records. Many soldiers were only briefly assigned to the corps, while they awaited their discharge orders. One consequence of the corps' personnel problems and the absence of a clearly defined mission was that AWOL and VD rates, traditionally the indicators of units that had problems, soared. Part of the solution was an aggressive program to discharge such soldiers, and in time the corps grew in stability, if not in size.

Again, just as in the years after World War I, there was no obvious potential enemy or impending conflict for which to prepare, and training concentrated on the basic soldier skills that were rapidly eroding as the Army dwindled in size and its combat veterans were discharged from the service. Exercise Tarheel, run in April and May 1949, was typical of the kind of training the corps was able to do in those austere years between the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. The headquarters reconstituted itself as Task Force Victor for an exercise the Army commander, Lt. Gen. Alvin C. Gillem, intended to use to train the headquarters and V Corps troops in simulated combat conditions, and to provide the utmost in practicable training in troop movement and field operations for battalion and regimental combat teams.

Besides a small aggressor group and various supporting units from corps troops, the major participant was the 82nd Airborne Division. The 3rd Infantry Division and the 31st Infantry Division were in the order of battle for the exercise, but did not actually participate, instead being represented by small planning staffs that served as response cells.

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

Exercise Tarheel, 1950. The exercise was conducted during the years (1945 to 1951) when V Corps was headquartered at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Small unit skirmishes in the sand hills around Fort Bragg involved the maneuver of tank and infantry units, coordinated with airborne assaults. Soldiers refreshed their proficiency in basic tactical skills while the battalion, regimental, and corps staffs exercised themselves in the planning and direction of tactical maneuver. Hodge subsequently characterized the exercise as successful and praised the corps headquarters and subordinate units. Tactical procedures were generally good, he thought, an indication that the Army was recovering the skills that the extended demobilization had allowed to atrophy.

Indicative of the condition of the Army as a whole, however, was Hodge's concluding remark that the 82nd Airborne was "a very fine division — a now-unusual division — but for the future it is not to continue to be regarded as unusual, for there must be more divisions just as fine."

The move to Germany

International events soon underscored Hodge's observation. Relations between the Soviet Union and the West, never really cordial even during the war, first cooled and then became progressively more antagonistic as the great powers debated the future political shape of the world. The four-power occupation of Germany and of Berlin became a focus of the growing confrontation as the Soviets attempted to force the western Allies out of Berlin during the blockades of the land routes into the city in 1948. The Korean War that erupted in July 1950 further exacerbated fears that the Soviets were planning a general offensive. Many thought that the war in Korea was a diversion that was intended to capture American attention and the majority of American combat power. Once decisively involved in Asia, the United States would, according to that line of reasoning, be unable to resist a Soviet takeover of western Europe. Such fears turned out to be baseless, but they contributed to the eventual decision to station more powerful forces in Europe.

By 1946, most American military units in Germany had been reorganized as constabulary forces. Intended to regulate the American occupation zone, constabulary units were lightly armed and structured for what was essentially police work. More to the point, their constabulary functions overrode their training as combat forces. As American leaders became increasingly alarmed about the aggressive policy the Soviet Union was pursuing in Europe, the need to station conventionally organized combat troops in Germany to replace the 30,000 constabulary soldiers became evident. The opening days of what came to be known as the Cold War thus saw the movement of major Army units from the United States to Germany. Among them was V Corps, which moved from Fort Bragg to Bad Nauheim in 1951, and to the I. G. Farben building in Frankfurt am Main

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

The Abrams Building

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

Upon its move to Germany, V Corps took up residence in Frankfurt am Main's I.G. Farben Building, which was renamed the Abrams Building (above) in honor of Lt. Gen. Creighton W. Abrams (right). The general asssumed command of the corps in 1963 and later was named Chief of Staff of the Army.

The Abrams Building was home to the corps for 43 years, from 1951, until the end of 1994 when the headquarters began moving to its present location on Campbell Barracks in Heidelberg.

early the next year.

As early as 1948, some of the constabulary squadrons had been reorganized as combat troops, forming three armored cavalry regiments, including the 14th Armored Cavalry that eventually fell under V Corps control. With the function of the Army in Europe definitely changed from occupation to defense, additional combat forces were quickly assigned. Seventh Army was activated in Stuttgart on 24 November 1950 to command the units that rapidly began to arrive in theater. In 1951, Seventh Army took command of V Corps and VII Corps to assume the form it was to retain for the next four decades.

V Corps arrived in June 1951 and was assigned to Seventh Army in August. Its two divisions were the 4th Infantry Division, arriving in May 1951, and the 2nd Armored Division, arriving in July. VII Corps arrived in Germany and took up its position on the right flank of V Corps in October, initially commanding the 28th Infantry Division and the 43rd Infantry Division, along with the 1st Infantry Division. In February 1952, Seventh Army transferred 1st Infantry Division to V Corps from VII Corps. In the course of 1952, the constabulary completely ceased operation.

Divisional reorganizations

A new Department of the Army plan approved on 1 July 1955 changed the way replacements were handled in Europe. Instead of an individual replacement system, whole units, together with family members, were exchanged between Europe and the Continental United States in what was known as Operation Gyroscope. The expectation was that such a replacement concept would improve unit morale and effectiveness, as well as producing cost savings. Each major unit rotation to Europe was scheduled for a 33-month tour. In Operation Gyroscope I, 26 May to 27 September 1955, the 10th Infantry Division replaced the 1st Infantry Division in the V Corps order of battle. Likewise, from May to June 1956, the 3rd Armored Division arrived in Operation Gyroscope III to replace the 4th Infantry Division. The 8th Infantry

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

In Operation Gyroscope, the Army replaced entire divisions at once, rather than individuals. Here the 3rd Armored Division arrives in Bremerhaven, Germany to join V Corps.

Division, later to come under V Corps command, arrived in October of 1956 in another Gyroscope rotation. Four years after beginning Gyroscope, Department of the Army decided to return to an individual replacement system, and the large unit rotations ended on 1 September 1959.

The structure of the divisions themselves underwent profound change in those years as well. The Army in the 1950s assumed that future war would inevitably be nuclear war, and Department of the Army in 1956 developed a plan to reorganize divisions to be not only more survivable on a nuclear battlefield, but also to be more flexible. The new organization was intended to give the division mobility, dispersion, superior intelligence, and communications. Under the Pentomic concept, the division did away with the combat command, the equivalent to the brigade echelon of command, as well as the regiment and the battalion, instead organizing its companies into five battle groups, each commanded by a colonel. The assumption was that there would be no fixed lines on such a battlefield, and the division had to be organized to fight in every direction at once. Conceptually, the battle groups would concentrate to take an objective and then rapidly disperse, so as not to present a profitable target for nuclear fires.

To enhance mobility, the goal was to make all parts of the division air-transportable. Conventional weapons were also improved, and the division was given its own nuclear artillery. By 1958, the Corporal rocket, with range up to 75 miles, was available, and the Redstone, with a range of 200 miles, had reached operational units. The Lacrosse, a short-range missile for close support of the infantry, was soon to enter the inventory. The corps had its own nuclear cannon artillery in the 280-mm gun, of which Seventh Army had six battalions.

Each battle group was a self-contained force capable of independent operations. Specifically organized to enable it to absorb new equipment, the Pentomic division soon received the M-14 rifle in the standard NATO 7.62mm caliber, the 7.62mm M60 machine gun, the diesel-powered M60 tank with 105mm cannon, and the lower-silhouette M-113 armored personnel carrier that, together with helicopters, gave the infantry high mobility. Smaller than a regiment, the battle group was larger than a battalion, consisting of four rifle companies and a mortar company in the standard infantry division. The division had a tank battalion, an armored cavalry squadron, a 105mm artillery battalion of five batteries, and a composite gun and missile battalion that could deliver nuclear fires. The 155mm howitzer battalion was reorganized to retain two 155mm batteries, but substituted one 8-inch howitzer battery and one Honest John rocket battery for the other two. Supporting units were generally pooled outside the division and provided as needed. The Pentomic division was smaller, at 13,748 officers and men, than the prior triangular division.

Following testing, the Army converted all of its divisions to the Pentomic organization between 1958 and 1960, including the divisions assigned to V and VII Corps in Germany. Problems with the Pentomic division quickly became apparent. Particularly evident to V Corps commanders were the facts that the Pentomic division lacked the combat power for sustained offensive operations and that it was far more difficult than with the triangular division to task organize for different missions. More directly, however, the United States soon lost its monopoly on tactical nuclear weapons, on which Pentomic operations were based. More importantly, the United States Army came to realize that tactical nuclear war was almost certainly not a viable concept, and that indulging in any kind of tactical nuclear exchange would probably lead to a strategic nuclear war.

Beginning, therefore, in 1961, although delayed in Europe until after the resolution of the 1961 Berlin Crisis, the Army carried through another reorganization of its divisions. The Reorganization Objectives Army Divisions, or ROAD Divisions, returned the Army to the triangular division organization, this time with three brigades that resembled the World War II combat commands in flexibility and adaptability, and particularly in their ability to command whatever mix of units was needed for a given mission. The ROAD division, to which V Corps converted in 1963, could fight either a nuclear or a conventional war and was powerful enough for sustained offensive operations. The division was mechanized, which meant that its infantry was mounted in armored personnel carriers. The division headquarters had two brigadier generals as assistant division commanders, one charged with directing the maneuver elements and the other with the logistical support. Beyond its maneuver brigades, the division had an armored cavalry squadron that included an air cavalry troop, a signal battalion, an engineer battalion that had a bridge company, an aviation battalion, a military police company, a robust division support command, and a division artillery with three battalions of 105mm howitzers and a composite battalion of 155mm guns and 8-inch howitzers.

The Army established the standard ROAD infantry division with eight mechanized infantry battalions and two tank battalions, though that organization varied widely, particularly in Europe, where the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces were so richly provided with armor. The armored division, by contrast, was organized with six tank battalions and five mechanized infantry battalions. In the early years of the ROAD reorganization, the designation "mechanized division" indicated that a division had seven mechanized infantry battalions and three armored battalions, though that was a distinction that soon became lost, except as the divisions in Europe were contrasted to the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions in the United States and the lighter 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii. All ROAD divisions were larger than Pentomic divisions and had at least twice the artillery firepower. By early 1964, both of the divisions in V Corps were settled in the new ROAD organization.

Defense of western Europe

Once committed to the defense of Western Europe, V Corps experienced no real change of mission for more than three decades. To describe the corps' operations for any given year between 1952 and 1990 was therefore essentially to describe operations for every year of the Cold War. The Victory Corps assumed responsibility for conducting United States Army, Europe, operations plans for the general defense of Germany from any attack by the Warsaw Pact forces. That portion of the general defense plan that pertained to the corps was precise and oriented the staff's attention and thinking toward the east, and toward means of countering a single, overwhelming threat.

The V Corps sector was roughly 50 miles in width and focused on the Fulda Gap, one of several natural avenues of

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

Tank gunnery remained a principal focus of V Corps during training during the Cold War. Here, the 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry, tests its firing skill.

approach from the eastern part of Germany into the west, and a place that Lt. Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, when he commanded V Corps in 1963 and 1964, once called "a playground for tanks." Defensive guidelines continually evolved to meet changing conditions, but the dominant pattern was that the corps' cavalry regiment (the 14th Armored Cavalry, until it was replaced by the 11th Armored Cavalry on 17 May 1972, at the end of the Vietnam War) patrolled the inter-German border and observed the movements of the East German and Soviet forces deployed along that boundary. Behind the cavalry screen, the corps was alert to maneuver the 3rd Armored Division and the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in response to any attack.

Original NATO defensive plans evolved to include units of the new West German army, the Bundeswehr, after 1955. The background of the Bundeswehr was fairly complicated. Germany enacted the Gundgesetz, the Basic Law that served as its constitution, in May 1949 and united the western occupation zones under a single civil government. In September of that year, Konrad Adenauer became the first West German chancellor, and steered Germany in the direction of closer ties with the former Allies. In October 1954, the Paris Peace Treaty was signed, officially ending the European portion of World War II. At that time, Germany was invited to join NATO. The treaty came into effect in March 1955, establishing the Federal Republic of Germany as a sovereign nation. In May, West Germany officially joined NATO. Two years later, in April 1957, and amid great public debate in Germany, the Bundeswehr drafted its first class of 10,000 conscripts. Thereafter, V Corps shared boundaries in the south with VII U.S. Corps and in the north with III (German) Korps.

In April 1976, Lt. Gen. Donn Starry, then corps commander, began to review the corps general defensive plans to use the doctrine of the active defense that emphasized the strength of the covering force and limited the designated reserves, relying instead on mobility to concentrate strength wherever required. Eventually, the active defense concept became a part of a larger Army doctrine known as AirLand Battle, a concept embodied in a new edition of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, and the corps continued to revise its own battle plans to reflect changing doctrine. Gerow and Huebner would probably have been quite comfortable with AirLand Battle doctrine, because it strongly reflected the style of battle that V Corps had practiced at the end of World War II. AirLand Battle emphasized swift, decisive operations that synchronized all of the firepower and maneuver forces available to the corps, together with all of the supporting functions of logistics, intelligence, and air power, conducted violently and with the agility that new mechanized equipment gave the maneuver units, and waged over the entire depth of the battlefield to fight not only the enemy forces in contact, but also to attack his follow-on echelons of forces.

Division structure changed in consonance with the development of AirLand Battle. In the early 1970s, once the war in Vietnam was over, Army attention returned to Europe, where a plan drafted in 1969 began to be implemented to add capabilities to the divisions of V and VII Corps. The AIM (Armored, Infantry, Mechanized divisions) modified organizational structure added air defense, additional aviation, and TOW anti-tank missile units to the divisional tables of organization, as well as additional tank battalions. At the same time, V Corps artillery added the Lance missile battalion, which was capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Department of the Army personnel policy at that time focused on keeping the units in Europe fully up to strength, which meant that while divisions in Europe had three maneuver brigades each, some divisions in the United States had only two Regular Army brigades and a round-out brigade from the Army Reserve or National Guard.

> In the early years of the Cold War, American leaders thought than an attack on western Europe was imminent... For almost 40 years, V Corps kept itself ready for that eventuality.

V Corps strength was increased in 1976 as a result of a 1974 bill sponsored by Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, requiring the Army to reduce support personnel in Europe by 18,000 and increase its combat spaces. The result was the Brigade-75 and Brigade-76 program, begun in 1975 to bring additional armored units to Germany. Brigade-75 was the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Armored Division, from Fort Hood, Texas which rotated its battalions through Grafenwöhr, Wildflecken and Hohenfels training areas on six-month tours. In 1976, that brigade was permanently assigned to Germany, under Seventh Army control, as 2nd Armored Division (Forward), at Garlstedt, in northern Germany. The role of 2nd Armored Division (Forward) was to be the lead element of III Corps, if that corps were deployed to Germany in the event of war.

Brigade-76, arriving in Germany in that calendar year, was the recently activated 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, from Fort Carson, Colorado. The brigade was stationed at Wiesbaden Air Base, which had until recently, been a U.S. Air Forces, Europe, installation. In the fall of 1976, the brigade was assigned to Seventh Army, rotating its subordinate units from Fort Carson on six-month tours of duty. In the autumn of 1977, the brigade was permanently assigned to Seventh Army and attached to a V Corps unit, the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), which had its headquarters in nearby Bad Kreuznach.

In 1983, V Corps began converting to the new Division 86 structure, a process that basically involved increasing the combat power of the divisions through the fielding of more powerful combat vehicles and helicopters. Division 86 reorganization began in V Corps with the 3rd Infantry Division, and involved fielding the M-1 tank and the M-2 Bradley fighting vehicle to complete the division structure and equipment that existed at the end of the Cold War. On 15 September 1984, the 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, inactivated in Wiesbaden, to complete the Division 86 reorganization in the corps.

Third Armored Division tankers fire in REFORGER 81.

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

In the early years of the Cold War, American leaders thought than an attack on western Europe was imminent, a belief that conditioned the American response to the war in Korea, where the Army sent National Guard divisions, rather than regular forces, in the early days of the fighting. Consequently, the Army maintained its European units at the highest possible state of readiness. As time went on, Army planners came to believe that a Warsaw Pact attack in Germany was increasingly less probable, but that it remained the greatest of all possible dangers to American national security if it ever materialized. For almost 40 years, V Corps kept itself ready for that eventuality. In doing so, the corps' watchword remained readiness, and in the opinion of many Cold War veterans, the Army in Europe in general, and V Corps and VII Corps in particular, was the most highly trained and ready part of the entire service.

Vigilance and preparedness for war

Life in V Corps focused on the eternal round of gunnery and field training exercises, and the battalions moved from garrison to Grafenwöhr, Vilseck, Baumholder, Hohenfels, and back to garrison with the regularity and inevitability of the changing of the seasons. Corps commanders demanded skilled maneuver, but for the individual soldier, platoon leader, company commander, and battalion commander, gunnery lay at the heart of all training. The overwhelming numerical strength of the Warsaw Pact forces confronting the corps demanded proficiency in gunnery above all else, and tank crew qualification in the armored battalions and Expert Infantry Badge qualification in the mechanized infantry battalions were the most important measures of true happiness. Thus, the experiences of a V Corps soldier who manned an M-26 tank in 1952, or an M48 tank in 1960, or an M60 tank in 1975, or and M-1 tank in 1989, were precisely similar. The same was true for infantrymen, artillerymen and soldiers of all the other branches throughout nearly four decades. Technical and tactical proficiency dominated the thoughts of leaders at all levels.

Exercises of all varieties filled the time that battalions were not involved in gunnery and maintenance. Winter maneuvers became an annual event, but in October 1963, Operation Big Lift, which brought the 2nd Armored Division from Fort Hood to participate in the annual exercise, set a new model for the scale of the event. V Corps, then under command of Abrams, was responsible for running Big Lift, which had a political purpose as well as a military one. President John F. Kennedy wished to demonstrate, in the aftermath of the 1961 Berlin confrontation, that the United States was determined to defend Europe. That exercise was also a rigorous test of the concept of positioning equipment in Europe that arriving troops could use.

In 1967, the United States announced plans to withdraw 28,000 troops, roughly two divisions, from Europe in 1968. To demonstrate its continued commitment to NATO, despite that drawdown, the U.S. agreed to a large-scale force deployment of not less than three brigades of a single division to Europe in an annual exercise. Thus was born REFORGER – the Return of Forces to Germany exercise — which drew on the experience of Big Lift, and which become one of the most enduring symbols of the Army in Europe during the Cold War. REFORGER not only tested the ability of conventional forces to fight in a conventional war scenario, while simultaneously testing the force projection capability of the American military establishment, but it also remained a demonstration of American determination to preserve the freedom of

western Europe. The first REFORGER, which the Russians denounced as a "major military provocation," began on 6 January 1969. Thereafter, V Corps participated in each of those annual exercises.

In Wintex exercises, the corps validated general defense and war plans and various administrative measures that supported those plans. Other exercises helped resolve questions about how best to cooperate with the NATO allies, and V Corps troops regularly went to the field with, or in conjunction with, French, Belgian, Dutch, British, Canadian, and German units to become familiar with those nations' equipment, organization, communications, and tactical doctrine. Still other exercises tested United States Army, Europe, operations plans. For most Cold War veterans, however, one of the dominant recollections of duty in Germany was the periodic and unannounced readiness test, when all soldiers were recalled to their units, generally in the middle of the night, and the units moved out to their general defense positions in accordance with a strict timetable that permitted no variance and admitted no excuses for failure. The ringing of a telephone in the middle of the night was, for many, the most enduring symbol of service in Europe during those tension-laden years.

Although the United States fought a war in Vietnam from early 1961 through 1973, the Army attempted to maintain high manning levels in Europe. V Corps reports still complained of shortages in certain ranks — particularly the middle-grade non-commissioned officers and company-grade officers that were in such demand in Vietnam — but the corps remained at more than 90 percent strength throughout the Cold War despite the hot war in Southeast Asia. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the rapid rotation of junior leaders and the unsettled condition of the Army as a whole produced serious morale and discipline problems in Europe, problems to which V Corps was not immune. During the second half of the 1970s, however, the Army systematically cured the disciplinary and morale problems that arose, in part, because of the Vietnam War.

The other characteristic of V Corps during the Cold War was a continuous modernization of equipment. The Warsaw Pact threat defined the requirements for new tanks and armored personnel carriers, and the corps steadily received the newest and most capable weapons the United States could produce. The centerpiece was naturally the tank, but maneuver doctrine, particularly after the publication of succeeding editions of Field Manual 100-5, and especially the version that outlined the tenets of AirLand Battle, demanded the upgrading of every category of military equipment. Thus, for example, the M-113 Armored Personnel Carrier replaced earlier equipment, and the M551 Sheridan light tank replaced the M-114 cavalry scout vehicle in the cavalry regiment. In turn, the M-3 Bradley scout vehicle replaced the Sheridan. The Lance missile replaced Honest John and Sergeant field artillery rockets. Each of those weapons was replaced by still more modern equipment, thanks to increased funding in the second half of the 1980s. By the end of the Cold War, V Corps' cavalry regiment, two divisions, supporting artillery, and other arms all had, or were in the process of receiving, fighting equipment that defined the state of the art. M-1 and, eventually, M-1A1 tanks replaced the fleet of aging M60 variants, while the M-2 and M-3 Bradley infantry squad and cavalry scout vehicles replaced the venerable M-113 armored personnel carrier. Upgrades in cannon artillery were matched by fielding of the Multiple Launch Rocket System. Similarly, the UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopter and AH-64 Apache attack helicopter replaced the aging UH-1 Iroquois and AH-1 Cobra aircraft.

Throughout the decades after 1952, V Corps stood in the center of the NATO line, literally and figuratively the keystone of the defenses of western Europe. Unlike the corps' previous assignments, that one turned out to have involved no great battles. The Cold War was nonetheless a period of enormous stress and years of apprehensive and watchful waiting. Occasionally, war seemed to come closer, sending V Corps troops up to the border in times of crisis. The Hungarian revolt of November 1956 was one such occasion. More serious still was the East German decision to close the border in Berlin in August, 1961, and the accompanying Soviet decision to encircle Berlin with combat divisions in support of the East German action while the German Democratic Republic built the Berlin Wall. Similarly, in October 1973, the Army in Europe moved to the field during the state of alert that was ordered at the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War.

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

The Iron Curtain, as seen at Fulda. During the Cold War, the border between East Germany and West Germany might also contain tank or vehicle obstacles, watch towers, dog runs and even minefields.

In addition to threats of war, V Corps soldiers were also subjected to personal attacks through the 1970s and 1980s. The Red Army Faction exploded bombs at V Corps headquarters and at the Terrace Club on the headquarters complex in May 1972, again in June 1976, and yet again in June and July 1982. Officers' clubs in Hanau, Gelnhausen, and Bamberg were bombed in June 1982, a year that saw the largest number of terrorist incidents (68) ever directed against American soldiers in Germany. Finally, in November 1985, a car bomb exploded at the Frankfurt post exchange, injuring 35 people. V Corps soldiers and their families lived under such threats for a dozen years.

When the Warsaw Pact collapsed in 1989 and both the Berlin Wall and the inter-German border fence went down, it shortly became clear to everyone in Europe that the Cold War was not only over, but had actually been won. The cost had been principally in national treasure, rather than in lives, as in America's earlier wars. The end result of many years of V Corps training, readiness, and intense effort, the conclusion of the Cold War was not, however, the end of V Corps' missions in Europe. Almost immediately, veterans of Cold War service became involved in attempting to bring calm to regions on the periphery of western Europe where the demise of communist systems had left instability and insecurity.

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

The Terrace Club behind corps headquarters in Frankfurt was bombed in May 1972 by members of the terrorits Red Army Faction. Throughout the 70s and 80s V Corps soldiers lived with the constant fear of terorism. In 1982 alone there were 68 terrorist threats against U.S. soldiers in Germany.

V

1990-

After the Cold War

The Persian Gulf War

Just as Americans began to think the threat of a major European war was at last a thing of the past, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait demonstrated that the collapse of the Warsaw Pact did not necessarily mean that the "new world order" would be a peaceful one. In November 1990, U.S. Army, Europe, sent a corps to Saudi Arabia to take part in Operation Desert Shield and, later, in Operation Desert Storm. Partly because V Corps had just had a change of command, USAREUR selected VII Corps headquarters for the job. The Jayhawk Corps was, however, a composite of V Corps and VII Corps units. The Victory Corps sent its 3rd Armored Division and some battalions from the 8th Infantry Division along with VII Corps, because the Spearhead Division was well advanced in its modernization process and was largely equipped with Bradley Fighting Vehicles. Even before VII Corps moved out, V Corps received orders to send its 12th Aviation Brigade to Southwest Asia. The corps then took on the mission of helping VII Corps deploy out of Germany. The corps provided additional equipment and ammunition to VII Corps and assumed control of those VII Corps troops — 23,482 of them — who did not deploy to Saudi Arabia. Units across V Corps gave up soldiers and equipment to get the deploying units up to 100 percent strength. In all, V Corps sent 26,878 soldiers to the Persian Gulf. Once the deployment was complete, the corps began training replacement squads, crews, and sections in armor, infantry, artillery, and engineer skills, and trained individual ready reservists from the United States in the same skills, in case the war in the desert turned out to be a long and costly one.

While VII Corps was waging its war in Southwest Asia, Lt. Gen. David M. Maddox kept V Corps focused other possible missions that might arise. Political instability in eastern and central Europe made the situation on NATO's periphery a risky one, and V Corps had to remain able to react swiftly if the need arose. Consequently, throughout the fighting in the Persian Gulf, V Corps trained hard, keeping its units at a peak of readiness. Once the war was over, the corps concentrated on recovering soldiers and equipment from Southwest Asia and continuing the drawdown process that had just been getting underway when the Persian Gulf War began. By the end of 1992, V Corps was the only remaining corps in Germany, and had reorganized to command the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 8th Infantry Division (soon to be re-flagged as the 1st Armored Division), and the 3rd Infantry Division, as well as a number of separate brigades. Immediately, the first of many out of sector missions sent V Corps troops out of Germany again.

Operation Provide Comfort

In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, Sadaam Hussein's army began a series of attacks on its internal Kurdish population, an action that propelled many civilian refugees to the northern part of the country, where Iraq shared a border with Turkey. In April 1991, reacting to a presidential order for the armed forces to assist in an international humanitarian relief action for that displaced group, the commander-in-chief, Europe, activated Joint Task Force Provide Comfort at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, under the command of Lt. Gen. John Shalikashvili, the deputy commander-in-chief. The U. S. Army component of JTF Provide Comfort was drawn from USAREUR. Task Force Bravo, commanded by Maj. Gen. Jay Garner, the deputy corps commander, deployed to Turkey starting on 13 April, with the self-deployment of Task Force Thunderhorse, drawn from the 4th Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Very quickly, every major command in USAREUR became involved, with the heaviest deployments coming from V Corps units. Many troop units were involved, but the major deployments came from the corps' aviation units, which assumed the mission in rotation after it became evident that the deployment would be a long one. The 4th (Combat Aviation) Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division, the initial command and control element, was replaced by the 11th Aviation Brigade in December 1991. The peak deployment involved 2,043 soldiers in the first phase of relief operations. By late 1992, the number had fallen to no more than 51, and the numbers of soldiers diminished steadily thereafter.

Operation Positive Force

Meanwhile, political and diplomatic developments further to the south created the context for another V Corps mission. To ensure the security of recently liberated Kuwait, U. S. Central Command had, upon the request of the government of Kuwait and the approval of the President of the United States, left the 1st (Ready First) Brigade, 3rd Armored Division, behind to occupy assembly areas as the theater reserve, provide a continued U.S. presence, and deter any future Iraqi aggression. In May 1991, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed USAREUR to dispatch a brigade-sized force to relieve the Ready First Brigade. Responding to those orders, V Corps deployed the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment there in Operation Positive Force. The Blackhorse, constituted as Task Force Victory, began its movement to Kuwait on the last day of May and assumed its mission on 15 June, when the last of its 3,700 troopers arrived.

The deployment was principally a personnel flow, since the regiment was able to take over equipment sets that the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions had left in Saudi Arabia. The task force established a base camp near Kuwait City and a range and training area to the west of the city, and then assumed its mission of observing the border. By late summer, it had become clear that there was little risk of further Iraqi military action, and USAREUR concluded that a battalion task force was ample for the mission. Therefore, the corps prepared the 3rd Battalion, 77th Armor, of 8th Infantry Division, to assume the Blackhorse's equipment and mission by 15 September 1991. At the end of November, TF 3-77 Armor had completed its uneventful tour of duty and returned to Mannheim. Thereafter, equipment remaining in Southwest Asia was used for training rotations of battalions that used Camps Doha and Monterey and the adjacent maneuver areas in Kuwait both to hone their skills in desert operations and to serve as an earnest of American intentions to defend Kuwait.

Operation Provide Promise

It soon became clear to V Corps planners that the post-Cold War world would be a complicated place in which to operate, not least because operations did not come one at a time, but often simultaneously instead. As early as April 1992, the corps commander had asked for regular updates on the rapidly deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia, and many on the staff anticipated that V Corps might be called upon to perform some mission there as part of the United Nations response. While, therefore, the staff orchestrated the 11th Armored Cavalry deployment to Kuwait, it kept a wary eye on developments in the Balkans.

That was a wise decision, for the President on 22 October 1992 directed the Army to send a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital to Zagreb, Croatia, for an unspecified period starting on 15 November. The civilian hospitals in Croatia were already overburdened with casualties from the fighting, and medical support had to be provided for the 20,000-man United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) scheduled to begin operations throughout the Former Republic of Yugoslavia that month. USAREUR gave the mission to V Corps, which in turn selected the 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital, stationed at Wiesbaden Air Base. The 68th Medical Group provided command and control for what became known as TF 212, and both 7th Medical Command and 21st Theater Army Area Command attached personnel to enhance the hospital's capabilities.

Detailed staff work ensued that set the stage for the deployment. The hospital was located at Camp Pleso, an area on the grounds of the international airport in Zagreb, alongside units of other nations involved in the United Nations effort. The hospital was shipped by rail from Wiesbaden, while the soldiers deployed by air. The 90 officers, one warrant officer, and 251 enlisted soldiers had the MASH operational, as planned, on 15 November 1992. After treating more than 3,000 patients from 30 countries, the 212th MASH was relieved in place by another V Corps unit, the 502nd MASH, which took over the mission at the end of April, 1993. At the end of its 179-day tour of duty, the 502nd MASH was replaced by an Air Force hospital, and direct V Corps involvement in the mission came to an end.

Pperation Restore Hope

The decade-long civil war in Somalia was the cause of the next V Corps mission, one that overlapped the hospital deployment to Croatia. The refugees fleeing the war in Somalia, a country impoverished not only by fighting, but also by drought, were in a desperate state by the summer of 1992. Various attempts by civilian agencies to relieve the situation not having been sufficient, the President directed U.S. Central Command to deploy 10th Mountain Division to Somalia to stabilize the political situation and orchestrate relief efforts. V Corps received the mission of augmenting the 10th Mountain Division's helicopter units, and began working in December of 1992 to prepare a unit from 12th Aviation Brigade for the mission.

Basing the task force on the 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation, the corps sent the battalion headquarters, a composite UH-60 company drawn from the battalion and the 1st Armored Division's 7/227th Aviation, a CH-47 company from the 502nd Aviation, the 159th Medical Company, an air ambulance unit attached from 7th Medical Command, an aviation intermediate maintenance company from 7/159th Aviation, and an air traffic control element from 3/58th Aviation. TF 5-158 began its deployment the day after the

The soldiers of V Corps' Task Force 5/158th Aviation conduct a ceremony upon their return from Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

corps was alerted for the mission and arrived in Mogadishu by 3 January, 1993. Advance elements conducted the first of six air assaults on 28 December and thereafter flew medical evacuation, combat service support, and administrative missions for 10th Mountain Division through the beginning of March, when the main body began to redeploy to Germany. The task force officially disbanded on 5 April 1993.

Operation Support Hope

Another civil war in Africa, this time in Rwanda, was the occasion for the next V Corps out-of-sector deployment. By April 1994, millions of refugees from the fighting had fled across the border into Zaire, and cholera and other diseases were causing deaths totaling around 1,000 a day in the refugee camps around Goma. One of the principal problems was a shortage of potable water. The United States agreed to take part in the humanitarian relief operations already underway and established a joint task force headquarters at U.S. European Command headquarters in Stuttgart to manage the effort. EUCOM set up a forward operating base in Zaire through which to channel food, medicines, and other relief supplies, and created Joint Task Force 51 under the commanding general, U.S. Southeastern Task Force, to run the operation in Africa.

V Corps provided forces to JTF 51, based in Entebbe, in what became a very swiftly evolving situation. Calling upon the 3rd Corps Support Command, the corps in July deployed a water purification unit to Zaire. The platoon had the capacity to produce 3,000 gallons of water at each of three sites, store 60,000 gallons of water at the production site, and distribute water at eight forward water supply points, each of which could store 15,000 gallons. In July, the corps deployed an engineer earthmoving platoon from the 94th Engineer Battalion to assist in handling the mass burials at the various refugee camps, and augmented medical teams in Zaire.

By August, the success of the humanitarian aid effort had enabled the Army to turn over much of the task to non-governmental agencies in Zaire, and other V Corps units that had been alerted for deployment to Africa were told to stand down. Throughout that and other deployments, the corps had been learning important lessons in working with the United Nations, in cooperating with non-governmental organizations, and in providing forces for operations under control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. One of the most important issues that the V Corps staff brought to the attention of joint planners was that U.S. Army units had to be deployed with appropriate command and control, support, and maintenance elements, if such support was not explicitly provided within the joint task force.

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

V Corps soldiers kept an eye on the Yugoslavia-Macedonai border as part of Task Force Able Sentry, but there was no validated doctrine for the mission at the time, and soldiers had to learn how to be peacekeepers.

Task Force Able Sentry

On January 6, 1994, V Corps assumed from the Berlin Brigade the mission of providing an infantry battalion to the United Nations Protective Force in Macedonia. The UNPROFOR had a mission unique in UN history of providing a peacekeeping force before hostilities erupted, with the intention of preventing fighting—in that case, between the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, generally referred to as Serbia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, generally referred to simply as Macedonia. The V Corps battalions manned the northeastern sector of the border between Macedonia and Serbia, with the Nordic Battalion (a composite battalion of Swedes, Norwegians, and Finns) manning observation posts to their left flank. The basic plan was to alternate the mission between infantry battalions of the 3rd Infantry Division and the 1st Armored Division. During the December, 1994, to May, 1995, rotation, the character of the operation changed. Because a measurable degree of stability had been assured, the United Nations renamed the deployed force the UNPREDEP, or United Nations Preventive Deployment.

The peace enforcement mission was unique for combat arms soldiers, and there was at that time no validated U.S. Army doctrine to guide them as they prepared for duty in Macedonia. To make up for the deficiency, training exercises prior to deployment drew on lessons learned by previous battalion rotations. As time went on, leaders down to squad level went to Macedonia on brief orientation tours — "right seat rides" — before their units arrived for duty. Training for dismounted peacekeeping operations also required changes in the way soldiers and their leaders thought. There were a number of problems inherent in changing the mindset of an infantry battalion from its traditional mission to one of peacekeeping. Fundamentally, peace enforcement missions stood normal combat operations on their heads. In patrolling, for example, the object was not to move quietly and unseen, but specifically to be seen. Weapons were not carried at the ready, but were often carried at sling arms, with the muzzle downward, when patrols went through towns. Most fundamentally, the soldiers were not there to fight, but to observe, monitor, and report the conditions along the border to the United Nations command.

Soldiers of the Berlin Brigade experienced the most austere conditions of any battalion rotation in Macedonia. Because each succeeding battalion worked hard to improve conditions, the amenities the soldiers enjoyed improved substantially as time went on. The first V Corps unit to deploy was the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, of the 3rd Infantry Division, and it was followed by a series of other battalions drawn from both the 3rd Infantry Division and the 1st Armored Division.

When the 1st Infantry Division replaced the 3rd Infantry Division in the V Corps order of battle, different numbered battalions thereafter assumed the duty of providing task forces for the Able Sentry mission. While the names changed, however, the soldiers were drawn from the same locations in Germany as before. With the deployment of 1st Armored Division in December 1995 and January 1996 to serve as the core of Task Force Eagle in Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia, changes had to be made in the planned battalion rotation for task forces deployed to Macedonia. Since mechanized infantry battalions were at a premium in Bosnia, a tank battalion was alerted and trained for the next rotation in Macedonia.

Fundamentally, the V Corps experience was that it was not easy to create a light infantry task force from a mechanized infantry battalion—much less from a tank battalion. Because the mechanized infantry battalion did not provide the requisite number of dismounted riflemen, commanders were obliged to restructure their units such that platoons were mixed among companies. That posed leadership challenges, because well-established teams had to be broken up, and small unit loyalties disrupted. Additional and unaccustomed requirements increased the training burden. Soldiers had to learn to deal effectively and appropriately with the civilian population, a task that occupied the majority of soldiers' time. Furthermore, the task force in Macedonia was equipped with weapons and equipment that are not standard to a U.S. Army battalion. Among them were five-ton trucks and the 81-mm mortar. Similarly, soldiers had to learn to operate and maintain non-standard generators and what they dubbed the Small Unit Support Vehicle, or SUSV, essentially a "Snow Cat." Most of that training had to be done in Macedonia, on the run, because the equipment was not available to the battalions in Germany.

Specific additional training was required for medical personnel because the isolation of the observation posts and the lack of American hospital support imposed the need for greater independence and autonomy on the part of the medics. One solution to the problem of providing adequate medical support to observation posts along the border, as well as to the task force base camp, was use of sophisticated new equipment such as the Tele-Med, which allowed direct contact with U.S. Army hospitals and the electronic transmittal of medical information to doctors for their review. Medics had to be trained in the use of that equipment, but they also required additional training to permit them greater autonomy in providing medical treatment.

> Operations in Macedonia, for the most part uneventful, were physically challenging for soldiers and, in the judgment of unit commanders, useful in developing good noncommissioned officers. ... Soldiers returned to Germany in excellent physical condition and well versed in patrolling. They were, however, no longer proficient Abrams or Bradley drivers, mechanics, gunners, and mounted infantrymen.

Operations in Macedonia, for the most part uneventful, were physically challenging for soldiers and, in the judgment of unit commanders, useful in developing good noncommissioned officers. Working within the United Nations chain of command was a learning experience for the task forces, as well as drawing logistical support from other than U.S. Army sources. Other challenges awaited task force commanders upon return of their units to home station in Germany. Once in garrison, the battalions had to be reconstituted as mechanized or armored units, once again sundering teams that leaders in Macedonia worked hard to build. For the duration of the six-month deployment, each task force focused its attention on dismounted infantry operations. Soldiers returned to Germany in excellent physical condition and well versed in patrolling. They were, however, no longer proficient Abrams or Bradley drivers, mechanics, gunners, and mounted infantrymen. Thus a major part of the redeployment plan included retraining a battalion to resume mission-capable status for the heavy force battle.

The Able Sentry deployments came to an end on 28 February 1999, when the Republic of China vetoed a United Nations resolution further to extend the mission in Macedonia. The change came just as Task Force 1-4 Cavalry arrived to take over from Task Force 1-18 Infantry. Because of other developments in the region that suggested the need to retain the base at Skopje, TF 1-4 Cavalry remained in Macedonia and was reconstituted as Task Force Sabre. The task force then played a part in the NATO mission in Kosovo that developed later that year. By the end of the Able Sentry mission, V Corps had trained and dispatched 12 battalion task forces for duty there.

Changes in training, organization, and operational techniques

Not only operations, but also training, changed during those busy years, as the

training design began to accommodate the shift away from operations based entirely on the general defense plan and buttressed the experience of ongoing deployments through exercises designed to explore the new problems involved. By 1990, the force-on-force REFORGER exercises, focused entirely on central Europe, were things of the past. Thereafter, both corps and USAREUR exercises had already begun the extensive use of computer-driven battle simulations and were considering the requirements for operating in other places and against other threats. For the corps, that started with a series of corps-level command post exercises in 1991 and 1992. by 1992, with Exercise Dragon Hammer in Sardinia, the focus of corps operations had shifted almost completely to out-of-sector missions. Ultimately, when Exercise Atlantic Resolve replaced REFORGER as the principal USAREUR annual exercise, operations in NATO's central region had clearly been supplanted by the expanded corps mission of reacting to contingencies anywhere in the EUCOM area of responsibility.

The Partnership For Peace program, introduced at the end of the Cold War, represented a broadening of corps training to allow it to include support for national objectives in the post-Cold War world. PFP sought direct contact with the armed forces of the former Warsaw Pact nations through a series of joint exercises. In part intended to establish relations with those nations, the PFP also broadened the military horizons of all the armies involved as they learned from each other. V Corps took part in almost all of the PFP exercises. The corps also dispatched a steady stream of soldiers, experts in various skills, as part of Mobile Training Teams assisting the armed forces of eastern Europe.

A further refinement of the exercise program was the Mission Rehearsal Exercise, which was foreshadowed in the carefully designed training through which battalion task forces went before taking up the Able Sentry mission in Macedonia, but which took their final form when V Corps began sending troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of Operation Joint Endeavor at the end of 1995. The Mission Rehearsal Exercise was a carefully planned and structured exercise that rehearsed units for operations in a specific theater of operations, in pursuit of very specific missions, and in a way that reflected the most current operational context to which the unit would have to adapt. Forging a partnership with USAREUR's Seventh Army Training Command, V Corps drew upon the expertise of units then serving in Bosnia-Herzegovina for current information and built a series of mission rehearsal exercises that prepared a succession of units for duty in the Balkans in a way that accommodated the rapidly changing conditions there. The series of Mountain Eagle exercises proved a very successful way to match the unit with its mission. The Mission Rehearsal Exercise thereafter became a normal tool for training V Corps task forces.

As time went on, the V Corps force structure introduced new variables into the planning process, for the corps by the mid-1990s was much smaller than it had been during the Cold War years. That meant not only that fewer units were available for the various missions assigned the corps, but also that there were fewer soldiers in each skill available for taskings to support ongoing missions and the plethora of Partnership For Peace exercises conducted throughout eastern Europe. In 1991, V Corps numbered 112,000 soldiers. By 1995, that number had dropped precipitously, since the Army in Europe counted only slightly more than 62,000 troops by then. By that year, the V Corps Artillery retained only one field artillery brigade, and that brigade commanded a single battalion; the corps' armored cavalry regiment had been reassigned to the United States; the 5th Personnel Group and 5th Finance Group had been inactivated; and each of the two divisions had been reduced to two maneuver brigades.

With that drawdown of forces nonetheless came additional missions. Incident to the post-Cold War reorganization of NATO, V Corps contributed the 1st Armored Division to a NATO contingency force, the Allied Forces, Central Europe, Rapid Reaction Corps — ARRC for short. The corps also took part in the activation of a pair of bi-national corps to be used in European contingencies. The 1st Armored Division was again assigned to the German II Korps, while the German 5th Panzer Division, in 2001 replaced by the 13th Panzer Division, was assigned to V Corps. USAREUR signed the implementing arrangement for the bi-national corps with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1993, and V Corps signed the Technical Arrangement with II Korps on 14 June 1994.

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

Soldiers of the 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital at work in Zagreb, Croatia in 1992. In the early 90s it became apparent that in the future V Corps' missions would take it beyond its traditional central European boundaries.

Allied to the evolving exercise focus, corps planners also began considering the new problem of displacing the corps to the region in which it would give battle. The first step in that process was a concept known as the Advance Support Echelon, in which the corps placed its combat units in a corps marshaling area and then laid down combat service support behind a cavalry screen and under an air defense umbrella, subsequently passing the maneuver units through the combat service support and into battle. That was an important first step away from what one corps planner called "logistics to four decimal places," and toward the uncertainties of supporting a deployment outside of Europe and in an immature theater of operations where the highly developed logistics infrastructure of NATO would not be available.

As the series of deployments outside of Germany continued, the headquarters and major subordinate commands developed a sophisticated understanding of how to move units of various size and capabilities not only within Germany, but also outside of Germany, and by using every imaginable means of transportation.

The headquarters move

On 25 February 1994, Department of the Army announced a decision that had been reached in 1993 to move V Corps from Frankfurt am Main to Heidelberg. The move was a logical extension of the continued drawdown of U.S. forces in Europe. As a general principal, USAREUR had attempted to consolidate its units in the military communities that had the best and most modern facilities, as well as the best locations in terms of training and other administrative requirements. The general conclusion was that, although the Frankfurt military community was ideally located from the point of view of communications and transportation nets, as well as being virtually in the center of the corps area, the community itself was too expensive to maintain.

PHOTO BY PFC R. ALAN MITCHELL

A trio of 1st Armored Division M-1 tanks coordinate their fire with a pair of Apache helicopters on a range in Glamoc, Bosnia and Herzegovina during Operation Joint Guard in April 1992.

Thus, chiefly in the interests of cost savings, V Corps received orders to move to Campbell Barracks in Heidelberg, thus ending a 43 year presence in the financial and banking capital of Germany and, incidentally, vacating the C. W. Abrams Building, probably better known as the I. G. Farben Building, one of the icons of the Army's Cold War service. Detailed planning had been undertaken prior to public announcement of the move, and the corps immediately began to implement the plans.

From the point of view of V Corps, the essential fact about the move was that it had to be so planned, organized, and executed that it was possible for the headquarters to continue to function throughout the 18 months the process would take. Normally, units scheduled to move were permitted to stand down while that move was taking place. Because V Corps was the only tactical formation remaining in the theater at the time of its move, USAREUR could not afford to grant the corps that luxury. Thus V Corps conducted the move, with all of its complications, against the background of a sustained high tempo of training and deployments. By December 1994, the move had been largely completed, and the building was returned to control of the German government in early 1995.

The essential element of the move plan was that the headquarters would operate simultaneously in both Frankfurt and Heidelberg while the move progressed, in order to provide the continuity of supervision required by corps operations. The success of the move planning may be gauged from the facts that corps training and deployment missions continued without interruption, and that the move of the headquarters went largely unnoticed by both subordinate and superior headquarters, neither of which noted any decrease in the capability of the staff or the efficiency with which the corps operated.

Operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard

In many ways, the NATO deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina was for V Corps the culmination of the preceding five years of preparation. When V Corps tanks and fighting vehicles moved during the winter of 1989-1990, they still invariably marched along the familiar paths from their garrisons in Germany to their units' general defense positions along the inter-German border, or else to ranges where crews honed their skills for conventional, heavy-force battle. The soldiers followed a routine that had hardly changed in more than three decades of Cold War duty in Germany. On New Years' Eve in 1995, however, the M-1A1 Abrams tanks of the 1st Squad-

ron, 1st Cavalry, led the 1st Armored Division across the Sava River bridge and into a NATO peace enforcement operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a mission that no one would have envisioned only a few years before, in a place that the Cold War-era planners would have considered highly unlikely.

It was not only a great physical distance from the Fulda Gap to the Posavina Corridor, but it was also a great conceptual distance from the philosophy of corps operations that underlay the notional conventional armored battle in NATO's central region, to the philosophy of corps operations that enabled V Corps to serve in 1996 as what its commander, Lt. Gen. John N. Abrams, called an "expeditionary corps." That shift in focus was five years in the making, and the deployment for Operation Joint Endeavor represented the maturing of a more versatile forward-based corps that had drawn on the experience of the out-of-sector operations that it had undertaken since the end of the Persian Gulf War.

At first purely a force-provider for the operation, V Corps quickly became more deeply involved. Because the ARRC was the headquarters commanding the operation in Bosnia, the 1st Armored Division, configured as Task Force Eagle, fell under ARRC command. USAREUR determined that it was necessary to create a National Support Element to carry out all of the various Title 10 responsibilities for U.S. forces in Bosnia, however, and therefore created a headquarters known as USAREUR (Forward), which it located in Taszar-Kaposvar, Hungary.

The USAREUR (Forward) headquarters was under command of Abrams, who wore the second hat of Deputy Commander, USAREUR (Forward), and drew heavily on V Corps to provide his staff. V Corps planners had already written the deployment plan that was incorporated in the USAREUR operations plan, and many of those officers moved to Hungary to supervise creation of the Intermediate Staging Base there and the execution of the operations plan. The National Support Element was operated by the 21st Theater Area Army Command (Forward), which was itself manned almost entirely by the commander and general staff of V Corps' 3rd Corps Support Command. All of V Corps' separate brigades sent units or elements to Hungary or, as required, to Bosnia, to manage the support requirements for Task Force Eagle. The Initial Entry Force began arriving in Bosnia by 16 December 1995 and paved the way for the 1st Armored Division deployment, which reached into Bosnia from the base area in Hungary on 1 January 1996. Thereafter, USAREUR (Forward) and its NSE managed the support for TF Eagle.

Meanwhile, V Corps headquarters had to constitute another general staff, this time in Germany. Task Force Victory, under Maj. Gen. Walter Yates, the Deputy Corps Commander, and using the general staff of V Corps Artillery, commenced operations at Wiesbaden Air Base. TF Victory commanded the rear detachments of deployed units and non-deploying units and managed the replacement flow into Hungary and Bosnia. The Corps Main headquarters, much depleted by all those detachments, remained in Heidelberg and commanded normal corps operations. With one division serving as the larger part of the 25,000 American troops in Bosnia and the bulk of the Corps Support Command serving in Hungary, the troops-to-task ratio was well below that to which units in Germany were accustomed. Despite that, all normal corps operations, including training rotations and NATO exercises, continued without interruption throughout the duration of the Bosnian deployment.

Corps (Main) and TF Victory planned the redeployment of 1st Armored Division to Germany at the end of its year in Bosnia. A brigade of the 1st Infantry Division entered Bosnia in December 1996, as a covering force to facilitate the withdrawal of 1st Armored Division, and then the Big Red One assumed the TF Eagle mission as of 21 December. On that date, Operation Joint Endeavor ended and the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) ceased operations. Immediately, Operation Joint Guard began, with 1st Infantry Division committed to the new NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR). Subsequent rotations of forces into Bosnia have included not just brigades of the two divisions assigned to V Corps, but also the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment from the U.S. As the operation proceeded, other units from the United States, including the 1st Cavalry Division, took up the peace enforcement mission in Bosnia in six-month rotation with 1st Armored Division and 1st Infantry Division.

Aside from its direct involvement in the many operations in Hungary and the former Yugoslav republics, V Corps played a central role in preparing and training the forces that carried out the NATO missions. The process began in the summer and fall of 1995, when the corps conducted Exercise Mountain Shield for a proposed Southern European Task Force mission in Bosnia, and continued with the Mountain Eagle series of exercises. Mountain Eagle exercises, planned and conducted by the corps and its major subordinate commands, trained each unit that assumed the IFOR, and then SFOR, mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

PHOTO BY STAFF SGT. BRIAN CUMPER

PHOTO BY SPC ALEJANDRO CABELLO

ABOVE: An engineer soldier beckons V Corps wheeled and tracked vehicles across the Sava bridge linking Zupania, Croatia with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jan. 1, 1996. The 2,033-foot bridge was longer than New York's Brooklyn Bridge.
TOP: A Combat Engineer Vehicle from V Corps' 130th Engineer Brigade smashes a bunker near Dubrave, Bosnia and Herzegovina during Operation Joint Endeavor in January 1996.

The Beirut Air Bridge and other aviation missions

After the 1984 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, the Department of State decided that it could no longer safely use the Beirut International Airport, and the Department of Defense stationed a helicopter detachment on Cyprus to take diplomats, diplomatic papers, and a limited amount of cargo into and out of the embassy. In 1986, what was then the 12th Aviation Group took over the mission, which V Corps units retained from the time of the Persian Gulf War until the embassy once again began using the Beirut airport in 1998.

The Executive Flight Detachment stationed at Akrotiri Royal Air Force Station, Cyprus, became a standing mission of the 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation, of the 12th Aviation Brigade, and specifically of that battalion's Company C, 7th Battalion, 158th Aviation. The flight detachment consisted of four UH-60 Black Hawk aircraft equipped with special navigation equipment and other systems required by the mission and one platoon of 27 soldiers, rotated on a sixty-day basis with the other platoons in Co. C, 7/158th. In addition to being qualified for long over-water flights, the flight detachment also was qualified to land on the decks of U.S. Navy ships operating in the Mediterranean. Because 5/158th Aviation was at the same time maintaining a second Black Hawk company in support of the Operation Provide Comfort relief operations in northern Iraq, management of limited aircrew and critical aviation maintenance skills became a continuing issue.

The standard mission from Cyprus to Beirut and back consumed seven hours from briefing through debriefing, and the detachment planned to fly up to 15 on-call missions every month. The mission profile required the standard two-aircraft mission to land at the embassy after a low-altitude final approach, remain on the ground for a very brief period, and abort the mission if fired upon. As far as could be determined, no flight detachment aircraft were ever fired at in the years the Beirut Air Bridge was in operation. In 1998, with a general easing of tensions in Lebanon, a civilian service replaced the Army flight detachment and the platoon returned to Germany.

Another aviation mission attracted a good deal of publicity when one of the heaviest snowfalls in Europe in recent years caused an avalanche that engulfed

PHOTO BY TROY DARR

V Corps soldiers from D Co., 5th Bn., 158th Aviation Regt. clean snow from the rotor blades of their Black Hawk helicopter in Garmisch, Germany on their way to help rescue tourists stranded by avalanches in the town of Galtur, Austria.

the town of Galtür, Austria, 40 kilometers northwest of Innsbruck, and blocked all the roads to the site of the disaster. Some 12,000 vacationers were trapped in Galtür and surrounding villages. The Austrian Government asked Switzerland, Germany, and the United States to help airlift the stranded vacationers from the avalanche area. Ten aircraft and a ground support package from the 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation, arrived in Austria on 24 February and started relief operations the next day. After flying 186 missions and lifting 3,109 passengers out of the affected area, the task force completed its operations on 26 February and returned to Germany.

Air defense deployments

After the end of the Persian Gulf War, air defense artillery units in USAREUR were reorganized. In the process the 32nd Army Air Defense Command, which had commanded all Army air defenses in theater, was returned to the United States, and all but two of the air defense artillery brigades were likewise returned to other stations. As part of that reorganization, the 69th ADA Brigade was assigned to V Corps, and it was soon reconfigured from standard corps air defense artillery brigade organization to become a pure Patriot missile brigade.

In June 1992, Operation Southern Watch officially began, under the ægis of United States Central Command, and specifically of Joint Task Force Southwest Asia. Operation Southern Watch monitored and controlled airspace south of the 33rd Parallel in Iraq, in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq at the end of the Persian Gulf War. As part of that operation, the United States dispatched a regular rotation of Patriot missile battalions to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to secure the airspace. The battalions of 69th ADA Brigade assumed that mission on three occasions, each time on a six-month rotation, after 1992. The 6th Battalion, 52nd Air Defense Artillery, went to Southwest Asia from March through July 1996 and again from June through November 1998, and the 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery had the mission from December 1999 through May 2000.

Tactical developments that began in USAREUR's 94th ADA Brigade and that were completed by 69th ADA Brigade made it much easier to deploy a Patriot fire unit on short notice. The Minimum Engagement Package that the two brigades developed involved only two launchers, one engagement control station, a radar and associated power unit, 12 missiles, a small amount of ancillary equipment, and 55 soldiers. The point was that the MEP could be transported in a single sortie of four C-5 aircraft. The battalions in 69th ADA Brigade rigorously rehearsed the MEP concept and developed detailed plans for packaging and loading its equipment. The concept was soon tested.

In December 1998, Sadaam Hussein again prevented United Nations weapons inspectors in Iraq from doing their work to make certain that Iraq possessed no weapons of mass destruction. In response, the United States and its allies threatened air strikes in what became Operation Desert Fox. Israel feared that Sadaam Hussein might fire Scud missiles at Israel in retaliation and asked the United States to augment its air defenses. Immediately, V Corps was ordered to send a Patriot missile task force to Israel in Operation Shining Presence.

PHOTO BY 1ST LT JAMIE BROWN

A Patriot missile crew of V Corps' 69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade live fires a rocket in Israel during a recent deployment.

Under command of the V Corps deputy commanding general, Maj. Gen. J. B. Burns, Joint Task Force Shining Presence deployed to Israel with an Army force built around Task Force Panther, which involved three MEPs from the batteries of the 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery. The task force arrived deployed out of Germany within 48 hours of notification and arrived in Israel on 12 December. It immediately conducted joint exercises with Israeli air defense forces before moving to firing locations at various key spots in Israel. The battalion remained in Israel until the coalition bombing campaign ended on 20 December, and then returned to Germany over the next day and a half.

Iraq remained at the center of events. Allied determination to enforce the United Nations resolutions concerning the "no-fly zone" in northern Iraq in January 1999 appeared likely to provoke some response from Sadaam Hussein. Since allied aircraft were operating from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, it appeared possible that Iraq might fire missiles at the Incirlik area to punish Turkey for providing the bases from which allied aircraft were launched. Thus, the government of Turkey asked the United States to help augment the anti-ballistic missile defenses of the Incirlik area.

On 15 January 1999, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave USAREUR the mission of sending a Patriot task force to Incirlik. USAREUR passed the mission to V Corps and its 69th ADA Brigade, which dispatched a MEP from the 6th Battalion, 52nd Air Defense Artillery that arrived in Turkey by 20 January. Task Force 6-52 came under control of Operation Northern Watch upon arrival in Incirlik and swiftly set up a battery location that the soldiers steadily improved over time. The initial force came from Battery D, with elements of the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and the 549th Maintenance Company. When it became clear that the Northern Watch mission would not be short, the battalion established a rotation of units, sequentially sending MEPs from Battery E, Battery A and Battery C to Incirlik. In March 1999, the deployment came to an end and the fire unit returned to Germany.

PHOTO BY BILL ROCHE

V Corps aviation assets have become more vital than ever, for missions that couldn't have even been imagined 20 years ago.

Two things characterized the air defense deployments that V Corps commanded. The first was a very short response time to a mission order, made possible in large part by the development of the MEP and careful brigade planning to detail how the deployment would be handled. The second was that overseas operations of air defense artillery units began decisively to affect the evolution of air defense artillery doctrine, inasmuch as the Air Defense Artillery School quickly adopted the MEP concept and made it a part of new editions of ADA field manuals.

Operation Victory Hawk

When the ethnic Albanian population of the province of Kosovo agitated for independence or union with Albania in the spring of 1999, Yugoslav authorities employed military force to regain control and bloodshed reminiscent of the worst years of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina threatened. International talks not having produced an agreement, chiefly because Serbia refused to accept the presence of a peacekeeping force in Kosovo, NATO decided in March of that year to use force to compel Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic to agree. Thus, on 24 March, began Operation Allied Force, an air campaign launched against Serbia and Serb military forces in Kosovo.

Gen. Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and Commander-in-Chief of U.S. forces in Europe, directed USAREUR to send an aviation and artillery task force of almost 1,800 soldiers to neighboring Macedonia as a means of increasing the pressure on Milosevic. The planned Apache helicopter task force, supported by Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, offered another way to attack Serb units, particularly armored units, in Kosovo. USAREUR directed V Corps to prepare the task force. Lt. Gen. John W. Hendrix, the corps commander, rapidly put together a force that eventually amounted to almost 5,000 soldiers when the destination was changed from Macedonia to Albania, where there were more demanding security requirements. The mission was called Operation Victory Hawk, and the force employed was Task Force Hawk.

Hendrix used the corps command post and deep operations coordination cell, including V Corps Artillery command elements, to control operations and built a force structure that included an attack helicopter organization of the 2nd and 6th

Squadrons, 6th Cavalry, from the 11th Aviation Brigade; a general aviation organization based around the 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation, from the 12th Aviation Brigade; the 1st Battalion, 27th Field Artillery (MLRS); the 7th Corps Support Group and ground forces of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division. The 2nd BCT organization included the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry (Mechanized) with an attached tank company and supporting artillery, air defense, signal, and other service forces, and the 2nd Battalion, 505th Airborne Infantry, attached from the 82nd Airborne Division. The 2/505th brought with it a towed howitzer battery. In addition, task force headquarters troops, controlled by the corps Special Troops Battalion, commanded elements of many of the corps separate brigades and a Special Forces detachment.

The lead elements of Task Force Hawk arrived in Albania on 8 April 1999 and forces continued to build up, the last units arriving 29 days later. Shortly after arrival at Tirana-Rinas airport, a small and highly congested field that was already being used by military and civilian organizations from many nations to provide humanitarian relief to Albanian Kosovars crossing the border into Albania, heavy rains began that swiftly reduced the land around the airfield to a quagmire. Major engineering work had to be contracted before the Apache helicopter task force and general aviation task force, then waiting in Italy for permission to cross the Adriatic, would have any place to land or any firm dispersal areas. The helicopters arrived on 21 April and established a minimum capability to conduct offensive operations the next day. By 26 April, 18 days after the mission started, Task Force Hawk had a force of 51 helicopters, 24 of which were AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, fully operational and had an additional 24 Apaches in Germany poised for deployment to Albania and awaiting orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Once in place and with the command post and DOCC functioning, Task Force Hawk began a series of mission rehearsal exercises for operations inside Kosovo. Called exercises, the frequent air missions were more properly combat feints that drew Serb military force, and especially air defenses, to the border, disclosed air defense locations, and did the essential reconnaissance for combat operations in the difficult, mountainous terrain along the border.

After 78 days of air operations, through most of which Task Force Hawk was present and threatening its own operations against Serb forces, the Yugoslav government finally agreed to sign the Military Technical Agreement authorizing the entry of NATO peace enforcement troops into Kosovo. That act, on 10 June, ended Operation Allied Force. Therewith, on 9 June, some elements of TF Hawk began deploying to Macedonia as part of TF Falcon. Four days later TF Falcon started its deployment into Kosovo as part of the Kosovo Force (KFOR), while other Task Force Hawk elements redeployed to Central Region. By 2 August 1999, all the major TF Hawk units had left Albania.

Operation Joint Guardian

Following immediately upon the conclusion of Operation Victory Hawk, elements of V Corps' 1st Armored Division and 1st Infantry Division moved into the province of Kosovo as part of NATO's peace enforcement mission under command of the Allied Forces, Central Europe, Ready Reaction Corps. The American contribution to Kosovo Force, or KFOR, was a reinforced brigade operating as Task Force Falcon in Operation Joint Guardian. The corps had planned to send the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, as the American component of the five multinational brigades under ARRC control. The division built plans for a 3,497-man force under command of the assistant division commander, Brig. Gen. Bantz Craddock, and carefully trained the base force, the 3rd BCT, in a series of exercises in the months prior to the deployment, completing a mission rehearsal exercise in February still involved in a combat maneuver training center rotation in the late spring, when the deployment order was issued. The need, however, to place American units in Kosovo as quickly as possible led to a change, and V Corps framed orders to deploy combat units then in Albania as the lead elements of Task Force Falcon. Thus, most of the force came from those elements of the 1st Armored Division and 82nd Airborne Division that had been stationed at Tirana, Albania.

The military technical agreement with Serbia was signed on 9 June, and Serb military forces began withdrawing from Kosovo on 10 and 11 June, with KFOR brigades flowing into the province immediately to the areas the Serbs vacated. While other elements of the corps headquarters and supporting units were moving from Albania back to their home stations in Germany, the helicopters of the 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation, carried the 2nd Battalion, 505th Airborne Infantry, from Tirana-Rinas Airfield to secure an initial cantonment area in Kosovo, with other forces following by road march. At the same time, the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit temporarily came under Craddock's command to increase the immediately available combat power. The American brigade melded into a British march unit and entered Kosovo at the same time, leading with the Task Force Falcon headquarters and a platoon from the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, brigade reconnaissance troop. Craddock selected two base camp areas, one in the eastern part of the sector and one in the west, which his units then occupied and built up as Camps Bondsteel and Monteith. By 14 June, all of Task Force Falcon was in Kosovo.

As the brigade was built up, the corps deployed four force packages into the area of operations. The first were the Task Force Hawk units and the 26th MEU, and they were followed in the first 30 days of the operation by the main body from Germany, and then by the multinational unit forces that came under TF Falcon control—a Greek mechanized infantry battalion, a Polish airborne battalion, and a Russian airborne task group.

The brigade took up peace support operations immediately in a seven-county area, performing the same kinds of tasks that Task Force Eagle had carried out earlier in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As 1st Infantry Division forces arrived, the Task Force Hawk units were returned to Germany and the Marine 26th MEU was likewise released. The 1st Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division shared the Task Force Falcon mission on 179-day rotations until 1 June 2001, when the XVIII Airborne Corps assigned units to Kosovo. With that transfer of authority, V Corps operations in Kosovo ceased for the time being, although USAREUR directed the corps to monitor and assist in subsequent transfers of authority between units assigned to Task Force Falcon.

PHOTO BY BILL ROCHE

Secretary of the Army Thomas White (center) listens intently as U.S. Army Europe Commander Gen. Montgomergy Meigs (right) explains V Corps rapidly deployable command post, the "Strike CP," during a recent test trial for exercise Victory Strike II.

The assault command post

The composition and operation of corps command posts was a matter of deep interest for all corps commanders. In the Cold War era, the corps maintained a structure of a rear command post that co-located with the Corps Support Command, a main command post where planning for future operations and support of current operations went on, and a tactical command post that ran the current battle. There were many variations on the detailed operation of those command posts to suit the style of command of various corps commanders, but the overall structure remained more or less unchanged until 1992, when V Corps began considering ways to move its forces to a battle somewhere other than along the inter-German border.

The first steps in that direction in 1992 and 1993 involved designing a very small, mobile command post on several trucks that the corps commander could use on the traditional battlefield when he was in transit between corps command posts or visiting one of the divisions, and that could also be used as the basis around which a command post deployed outside of Germany could be build. That led directly to a new design for a deployable command post that the corps called the "Tac-Plus," and which was based upon the tactical command post, augmented in subsequent air missions by other capabilities needed to sustain command of deployed forces in the opening phases of a campaign.

When the corps moved its command post to Albania for Operation Victory Hawk, the vans, trailers, and other truck-mounted equipment required an inordinate amount of heavy, strategic airlift. Reasoning that the corps could not rely on getting priority on strategic airlift, and that a command post that could be moved by the C-130 tactical airlift aircraft available in Europe would be more useful to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command, the corps began an intensive effort to make the command post smaller, lighter, more mobile, and more quickly deployable.

The resulting "Victory Vanguard" command post, designed in 2000 and tested in the Victory Strike exercise in Poland along with the deep operations coordination cell, was the first step in a process of design and testing that led up to the "Strike CP" that the corps exercised in Exercise Victory Strike II and demonstrated to the Secretary of the Army in September 2001.

The goal that the corps commander, Lt. Gen. James C. Riley, expressed, was for the Strike CP to be deployable with less than 20 C-130 air missions, and to be fully deployed and operational in about two weeks from initial mission notification. The specific design of the CP was understood to vary depending on the mission of the force it was to command, and the goal was to give the commander-in-chief a good command and control capability in the very early phase of a deterrence or defense mission. Throughout 2001, the corps worked at making the Strike CP more strategically deployable and, at the same time, figuring out how to make it tactically mobile once in a theater of operations.

Meanwhile, the corps retained the capability to go to the field with the full command post structure of tactical, main, and rear in the event of a heavy force operation of a conventional nature. Doing both allowed V Corps to plan realistically to command forces in operations at any point on the spectrum of conflict with a command post appropriate to the troops employed and the mission to be accomplished.

Exercise Victory Strike

The earlier work that V Corps had done in developing the mission rehearsal exercise was further elaborated upon in

2000 when the corps held its first Victory Strike exercise. The mission in Albania had revealed areas in which attack aviation operations could be improved, and Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs in February 2000 sent the Chief of Staff of the Army an Aviation White Paper in which he detailed ways to make USAREUR Army aviation "the premier aviation force for the U.S. Army over the next two years."

Riley assumed responsibility for a more stringent form of aviation exercise as one of the major corps actions in support of that initiative. Riley believed that attack aviation battalions needed to have a Capstone training event that was similar to the National Training Center rotations through which maneuver battalions had been going since 1983. To provide for aviation battalions the same rigor, realism of the battlefield, and high fidelity feedback that combat training centers gave maneuver battalions, he directed the corps staff, working with USAREUR, to devise the exercise that became Victory Strike.

Conducted at the Drawsko Pomorskie training area in Poland, Victory Strike exercised all of those elements of deploying and employing a deep strike task force that previous corps missions shown were critical components of a successful operation. Deployment, both by various ground means and by tactical airlift, was a key part of an exercise that involved live-fire by attack helicopters, the employment of Multiple Launch Rocket Systems from the corps artillery to fire joint suppression of air defense missions, and the use of 69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade units to simulate an opposing enemy air defense force. In addition, the exercise established ties with the Polish armed forces, which also took part, and exercised the deployment and employment of a much smaller and more mobile corps command post and deep operations coordination cell.

Exercise Victory Strike II in 2001 built upon the successes of the first exercise and was much more joint in nature. The exercise was expanded to include Poland's Wedrzyn Training Area, and added Polish units such as the 23rd Brigade of Artillery to the opposing force headed by 69th ADA. Exercise play was closely monitored by a vast array of sophisticated new battlefield tracking systems expected to be the keystone in making Riley's vision of providing NTC-type training for aviation and maneuver units available in the European theater, using a deployable training package to provide real-time recording of exercise events and near-immediate feedback for commanders. It also built upon preparatory exercises in Germany by further validating the Strike CP concept, putting the CP to its first real field test.

A combined opposing force took on V Corps' 11th Aviation Regiment Apaches during force-on-force exercises in exercise Victory Strike II. At top, a Stinger team from Hanau's 5/7th Field Artillery tried to take out the attack copters with their rocket simulator while their "teammates," a Multiple Launch Rocket System crew from the Polish 23rd Brigade of Artillery (below), did the same.

PHOTO BY SPC KRIS STEWARD

PHOTO BY SPC JOHN SOUCY

A more sophisticated exercise design

As the corps and its major subordinate commands accumulated experience with deployments, proficiency with a wider range of missions also developed as successive corps commanders required a concomitant increase in operational sophistication. The evolution of the mission rehearsal exercise was an important step in that process. Another came in 2001, when Riley linked exercises with leader development. In February of that year, he convened a seminar with his senior commanders and staff to discuss the attributes of the ideal leader in the modern operational environment and to find ways to adjust the conditions within V Corps to foster development of those attributes wherever necessary. A key point was that much would be demanded of leaders at all levels if they were to operate effectively and efficiently on the many types of battlefields the corps could expect, at any point in the wide range of missions from peace enforcement or humanitarian relief to heavy force combat, and in difficult operational environments, particularly in the third world. From the discussions emerged a consensus that leaders had to be adaptable, innovative, aggressive, willing to act in the absence of orders, and willing to take calculated risks on the battlefield; that such leadership should be rewarded; and that some adjustments to the way the corps did business needed to be made to foster the growth of that kind of leadership.

The first major aspect of corps operations to be so adjusted was the exercise program. Riley took the point of view that the kind of leadership necessary in the post-Cold War world had to be developed at home station according to a carefully thought out plan that involved all of the corps training and exercises. The seminar had addressed the idea, noting that exercises and rotations in the combat training centers needed to make allowance for the fact that units and leaders arrived in differing states of training and with varying capabilities. The conduct of training and exercises needed to be managed so that a more capable and advanced unit, for example, would be given more complex and challenging maneuver or other training tasks. Revising the process of training was also necessary to subject units to real sustained operations in which commanders would have to rely on their staffs and subordinates rather than running everything themselves, reserving the after action review for later. Laying stress upon "actions without orders," tactical initiative, and keying operations to the commander's intent, rather than merely to stated objectives, were all elements of the change that Riley wanted to make. He determined that leaders could not be flexible if their training was inflexible.

As a first step, he applied that truism to the major divisional training event, the Battle Command Training Program Warfighter Exercise, or WFX. The WFX scheduled for 2001 was to be given to 1st Armored Division and was based on the familiar heavy force operational scenario. From the point of view of developing the kind of leadership that Riley sought, the BCTP had shortcomings, since the exercise was predictable and scripted and presented few opportunities for leaders at any level to be innovative. Working with Gen. (Ret.) Fred Franks, who was one of the BCTP senior mentors, and with Lt. Gen. W. M. Steele, commanding the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Riley developed a different and more challenging scenario for the exercise and then obtained approval from Meigs, commander of USAREUR and Seventh Army, and the Chief of Staff of the Army, to implement that scenario.

The first major difference that distinguished Exercise Urgent Victory '01 from prior Warfighter exercises was that it involved both of the V Corps divisions. As the exercise began, 1st Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division were separated by 3rd Infantry Division, which was represented by a response cell manned by members of the V Corps staff. Later in the exercise, the two divisions operated side by side, so that the corps

PHOTO BY SGT ALFREDO BARRAZA JR.

An ammunition sergeant checks the munitions on an Apache helicopter flown by V Corps' 6th Squadron, 6th Cavalry, 11th Aviation Regiment, prior to a live-fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina during Operation Joint Forge in 1998. Today, V Corps leaders at all levels have to be ready for all types of missions, from peacekeeping to heavy combat.

could consider cooperation across division boundaries and the other issues involved with flank units. At a more fundamental level, however, Urgent Victory '01 offered a scenario more attuned the kind of situation that V Corps could actually encounter. It began as a movement to contact exercise with all units in motion as the exercise started, and developed into a meeting engagement in which units had far less precise intelligence about the enemy forces than was characteristic for the WFX. Given the experiences corps units and other elements of the U.S. armed forces had undergone in Balkans operations, Riley believed that less information about the enemy was more realistic.

Innovative in many ways, Exercise Urgent Victory '01 was a success for V Corps. The exercise design provided many opportunities for leaders to try out tactical ideas and develop the situation within their understanding of the commander's intent, thereby beginning the process of linking leader development with the corps exercise program. At the same time, both divisions were well exercised and tested in the traditional sense, so that the basic BCTP objective was accomplished as well. After the BCTP, the corps began working to implement the same exercise philosophy at every echelon of command, and to extend the same kinds of leadership development opportunities throughout the chain of command.

The Immediate Ready Force

The development of USAREUR's Immediate Ready Force was closely conceptually linked to the development of the corps Strike CP—both represented small, agile, rapidly and easily deployable elements that the commander-in-chief could use in a crisis. In 1994, the corps staff began devoting some thought to how heavy armored forces could be quickly deployed outside of Germany if the need arose. The initial concept was to create an alert roster for a heavy company that would use a set of equipment packaged in pre-configured air loads for a heavy company-team mission. Work on the idea was interrupted in 1995 and 1996 when V Corps turned its entire attention to the ongoing NATO mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but both the corps and USAREUR resumed work after Task Force Hawk returned from Albania in the spring of 1999.

To give EUCOM a more rapidly deployable force, Meigs began discussing the idea with Lt. Gen. John Hendrix, the V Corps commander. Hendrix suggested using the model of the 3rd Infantry Division, which had created an immediate ready company (IRC) for hasty deployments. The V Corps concept that evolved by September 1999 was a balanced mechanized company team that could be augmented as required by force enhancement modules that included command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence; aviation; multiple launch rocket system; logistics; and engineers. The corps aimed at having such a company operational by 15 December 1999, and the concept assumed that the designated ready company would have normal standards of proficiency, so that the IRC would require only familiarization gunnery, not including Table 8. The 1st Armored Division took over the IRC mission from December 1999 through 1 July 2000.

Total equipment included four tanks, five Bradley Fighting Vehicles, one M-113 armored personnel carrier, three Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTTs), one High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), one M88 recovery vehicle, and the other associated heavy equipment. The personnel strength amounted to seven officers and 83 other ranks, among which were one infantry platoon and one armored platoon. The entire package, chiefly because of the size of the tanks and Bradleys, required eight C-5B or C-17 aircraft for aerial deployment.

When Meigs returned to Heidelberg from his position as COMSFOR in October 1999, he reviewed the concept and incorporated the V Corps concept of the Immediate Ready Company into the evolving USAREUR plan. Meigs based his concept on equipment that could be deployed quickly by the C-130 aircraft daily available in theater, which meant in effect that the force had to be mounted in M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers and HMMWVs. The highest alert force was SETAF's 173rd Airborne Brigade, which could deploy its 1st Battalion, 508th Airborne Infantry task force, including a field artillery battery and an air defense battery, within twelve hours. The heavy force from Central Region was intended to link up with the theater strategic reserve on order to give USAREUR a quick strike capability.

PHOTO BY SGT BRENT HUNT

Soldiers from V Corps' 22nd Signal Brigade and Special Troops Battalion train on loading the "Strike CP' and its associated equipment at Ramstein Air Base in the summer of 2001. Both the corps and U.S. Army Europe are working toward command and control elements that can be quickly packaged, moved and set up wherever needed.

Within V Corps, the Medium Ready Company was the most ready force and was mounted in M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers because those could be lifted by C-130 aircraft. To follow the MRC, a Heavy Ready Company with a tank platoon and a Bradley platoon were ready for airlift with a minimal number of C-17 sorties. Depending upon the mission, a series of force enhancement modules, as originally conceived for the IRC concept and all capable of being moved on C-130 aircraft, was on call to give the deployed force additional capabilities and to sustain it. The final IRF configuration included force enhancements of engineers for reconnaissance, mobility, and route clearance; military police for security; scouts for reconnaissance or security; combat service support; and a tactical command and control force enhancement module designed to provide mobile command and control for task force or battalion tactical command post.

The corps planned a process by which the brigades of the 1st Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions could establish an orderly rotation of the IRF mission and instituted a series of emergency deployment readiness exercises in conjunction with SETAF to test and hone the deployment concept. The first test came in June 2000, when Meigs directed an evaluation of the IRF. Soldiers from the Southern European Task Force's 173rd Airborne Brigade and 1st Armored Division deployed as an IRF in C-130s and UH-60s to Hungary as part of Exercise Lariat Response. Two months later, USAREUR deployed 120 soldiers from 1st Infantry Division's 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, and 1st Military Police Company when it sent the Medium Ready Company to Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, to augment Task Force Falcon units involved in the peacekeeping operation there. The company remained in Kosovo just over a month before returning to Germany.

U.S. ARMY PHOTO

A V Corps Military Policeman prepares to throw a grenade into a bunker in training at Grafenwoehr, Germany.

Toward the future

In 2001, V Corps found itself with a completely new set of missions, far removed from the mission it accomplished during the Cold War. Emphasizing the kind of agility and flexibility that characterized Gen. Crosbie Saint's 1989 vision of the "capable corps," V Corps remained poised to respond to crises anywhere in the hemisphere. The planning for regional operations throughout the EUCOM area of responsibility prompted the corps to adopt an additional and informal motto that V Corps was "an ocean closer" in case of emergency.

As 2001 drew to a close, V Corps was sobered by the events of September 11, when terrorists attacked the World Trade Towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., causing great destruction and loss of life. As a consequence, the corps, along with the rest of the Army in Europe, enacted a series of stringent security measures to protect its soldiers, families, and installations and prepared itself to carry out its part in the war on terrorism that had just begun. Having taken all of those precautions, however, V Corps proceeded with its normal regimen of exercises and other military activities to maintain its proficiency for combat anywhere in the region and at any point along the spectrum of conflict.

Thus, the 83rd anniversary of its activation found the Victory Corps still in Europe, where it was created in 1918. After two World Wars, decades of Cold War and threat of another world war, the first hectic decade of what some called peace, and the opening of an entirely different sort of war against international terrorism, the corps remained where it has spent the greatest part of its organizational life, "an ocean closer" to potential trouble and prepared to do what is required of it. In 2001, as in 1918 and all the intervening years, the Victory Corps remained ready to fulfill its motto . . .

It Will Be Done!

Command Roster

V CORPS COMMANDERS

World War I

Maj. Gen. William M. Wright
12 July 1918 to 20 August 1918
Maj. Gen. George H. Cameron
21 August 1918 to 11 October 1919
Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall
12 October 1918 to 2 May 1919

Reactivation and World War II

Maj. Gen. Campbell B. Hodges
20 October 1940 to 16 March 1941
Maj. Gen. Edmund L. Daley
17 March 1941 to 19 January 1942
Maj. Gen. William S. Key
10 January 1942 to 19 May 1942
Maj. Gen. Russell P. Hartle
20 May 1942 to 14 July 1943
Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow
15 July 1943 to 17 September 1944
Maj. Gen. Edward H. Brooks
18 September 1944 to 4 October 1944
Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow
5 October 1944 to 14 January 1945
Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner
15 January 1945 to 11 November 1945

Cold War era

Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn
12 November 1945 to 6 June 1946
Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward
7 June 1946 to 15 November 1946
Maj. Gen. S. LeRoy Irwin
16 November 1946 to 31 October 1948
Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge
1 November 1948 to 31 August 1950
Lt. Gen. John W. Leonard
1 September 1950 to 18 June 1951
Brig. Gen. Boniface Campbell
19 June 1951 to 1 August 1951
Maj. Gen. John E. Dahlquist
2 August 1951 to 4 March 1953
Maj. Gen. Ira P. Swift
5 March 1953 to 17 June 1954
Lt. Gen. Charles E. Hart
18 June 1954 to 28 March 1956
Lt. Gen. Lemuel Mathewson
29 March 1956 to 16 August 1957
Lt. Gen. F. W. Farrell
17 August 1957 to 31 March 1959
Lt. Gen. Paul D. Adams
1 Aprl 1959 to 30 September 1960
Lt. Gen. Frederic J. Brown
1 October 1960 to 28 August 1961
Lt. Gen. John K. Waters
29 August 1961 to 14 May 1962
Lt. Gen. J. H. Michaelis
15 May 1962 to 14 July 1963
Lt. Gen. Creighton W. Abrams
15 July 1963 to 3 August 1964
Lt. Gen. James H. Polk
1 September 1964 to 27 February 1966
Lt. Gen. George R. Mather
28 February 1966 to 31 May 1967
Lt. Gen. Andrew J. Boyle
1 July 1967 to 31 July 1969
Lt. Gen. C. E. Hutchin, Jr.
15 September 1969 to 23 January 1971
Lt. Gen. Willard Pearson
14 February 1971 to 31 May 1973
Lt. Gen. William R. Desobry
1 June 1973 to 24 August 1975
Lt. Gen. Robert L. Fair
25 August 1975 to 4 January 1976
Lt. Gen. Donn A. Starry
16 February 1976 to 17 June 1977
Lt. Gen. Sidney B. Berry
19 July 1977 to 27 February 1980
Lt. Gen. Willard W. Scott, Jr.
27 February 1980 to 15 July 1981
Lt. Gen. Paul S. Williams, Jr.
15 July 1981 to 29 May 1984
Lt. Gen. Robert L. Wetzel
29 May 1984 to 23 June 1986
Lt. Gen. Colin L. Powell
23 June 1986 to 1 January 1987
Maj. Gen. Lincoln Jones III
1 January 1987 to 23 March 1987
Lt. Gen. John W. Woodmansee, Jr.
23 March 1987 to 21 July 1989
Lt. Gen. George A. Joulwan
7 August 1989 to 9 November 1990

Post-Cold War era

Lt. Gen. David M. Maddox
9 November 1990 to 17 June 1992
Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford
17 June 1992 to 6 April 1995
Lt. Gen. John N. Abrams
6 April 1995 to 31 July 1997
Lt. Gen. John W. Hendrix
31 July 1997 to 16 November 1999
Lt. Gen. James C. Riley
16 November 1999 – 18 July 2001
Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace
18 July 2001 to

V CORPS DEPUTY COMMANDERS

The position of deputy commanding general was first authorized under Table of Organization and Equipment 52-2H (28 September 1974), but V Corps did not organize under that TOE until 21 May 1977. Until that time it was under TOE 52-1H.

Cold War era

Maj. Gen. William L. Webb, Jr.
15 January 1978-9 December 1978
Maj. Gen. Charles C. Rogers
1 December 1978-9 July 1980
Maj. Gen. Philip R. Feir
16 September 1980-23 July 1981
Maj. Gen. John W. Woodmansee, Jr.
23 July 1981-10 June 1982
Maj. Gen. Stephen E. Nichols
1 July 1982-31 October 1983
Maj. Gen. Jerry R. Curry
1 November 1983-15 December 1984
Maj. Gen. Lincoln Jones III
25 March 1985-16 July 1987
Maj. Gen. Jack. D. Woodall
20 August 1987-3 May 1988
Maj. Gen. Donald E. Eckelbarger
25 May 1988-9 August 1990

Post-Cold war era

Maj. Gen. Jay M. Garner
9 August 1990-13 December 1991
Maj. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford
21 January 1992-17 June 1992
Maj. Gen. Jarrett J. Robertson
17 June 1992-23 February 1993
Maj. Gen. Henry A. Kievenaar, Jr.
18 May 1993-23 September 1994
Maj. Gen. Walter H. Yates
26 September 1994-24 September 1996
Maj. Gen. Gregory A. Rountree
23 September 1996-28 August 1998
Maj. Gen. Julian Burns
28 August 1998-16 August 1999
Maj. Gen. Reginal Graham Clemmons
16 August 1999- 1 November 2000
Maj. Gen. Robert F. Dees
1 November 2000 -

V CORPS CHIEFS OF STAFF

World War I

Brig. Gen. Wilson B. Burtt
12 July 1918 - 10 February 1919

Reactivation and World War II

Col. Walter S. Drysdale
June - August 1940
Col. George M. Peek
August 1940 - October 1941
Col. John H. Knuebel
November 1941-June 1942
Col. Karl E. Henion
July 1942 - December 1944
Col. Stanhope Mason
January 1945 - September 1945

Cold War era

Col. Thomas J. Ford
October-December 1945
Col. Wilhelm P. Johnson
January-May 1946
Brig. Gen. Orlando Ward
7 June 1946 - 15 November 1946
Col. Paul J. Black
November 1946 - December 1947
Brig. Gen. Cornelius E. Ryan
January 1948-December 1949
Brig. Gen. Homer W. Kiefer
January-December 1950
Brig. Gen. Peerson Menoher
January-December 1951
Brig. Gen. George W. Read, Jr.
January -March 1952
Brig. Gen. Joseph H. Harper
March 1952-April 1953
Brig. Gen. Raymond E. Bell
July 1953-September 1955
Brig. Gen. Marion W. Schewe
6 September 1955-16 January 1956
Col. William E. DePuy
January-June 1956
Brig. Gen. William M. Breckenridge
July-December 1956
Brig. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell
January 1957-June 1959
Brig. Gen. David W. Gray
July-December 1959
Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Bastian, Jr.
July 1960-June 1961
Brig. Gen. Frank T. Mildren
July 1961-June 1962
Brig. Gen. Michael S. Davison
July 1962-March 1963
Brig. Gen. Roderick Wetherill
April 1963-December 1964
Brig. Gen. Julian J. Ewell
2 June 1965 - 15 May 1966
Brig. Gen. Olinto M. Barsanti
16 May 1966-29 September 1966
Brig. Gen. Franklin M. Davis, Jr.
30 September 1966-16 July 1967
Col. Robert M. Tarbox
17 July 1967-17 September 1967
Col. Jack. F. Belford
18 September 1967-16 October 1967
Col. Jack A. Rogers
17 October 1967-9June 1968
Brig. Gen. Marshall B. Garth
3 September 1969-26 March 1970
Col. Thomas H. Tarver
27 Mar 1970-30 June 1970
Col. Thomas W. Bowen
1 July 1970-25 April 1971
Brig. Gen. Harold R. Aaron
26 April 1971-28 August 1972
Brig. Gen. Richard J. Eaton
29 August 1972-30 June 1974
Brig. Gen. Daniel W. French
1 July 1974-30 June 1975
Brig. Gen. Jerry R. Curry
1 July 1975-25 April 1976
Brig. Gen. James H. Merryman
26 April 1976-June 1977
Brig. Gen. John L. Ballantyne II
2 January 1977-15 June 1979
Brig. Gen. Joe S. Owens
23 February 1979-28 September 1980
Brig. Gen. Joseph L. Nagel
22 July 1983-24 August 1984
Brig. Gen. Cecil N. Noely
7 September 1984-14 October 1985
Brig. Gen. Ross W. Crossley
15 October 1985 - July 1988
Brig. Gen. Timothy J. Grogan
1 August 1988-5 October 1989

Post-Cold War era

Brig. Gen. James R. Harding
5 November 1989-9 June 1991
Brig. Gen. James S. Dickey
10 June 1991-10 July 1992
Brig. Gen. Henry A. Kievenaar, Jr.
3 August 1992-17 May 1993
Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs
17 May 1993-28 August 1994
Brig. Gen. George H. Harmeyer
28 August 1994-25 June 1995
Brig. Gen. George W. Casey, Jr.
3 October 1995-17 August 1996
Brig. Gen. B. B. Bell
23 August 1996-30 May 1997
Col. (P) Raymond T. Odierno
21 July 1997 - 15 August 1998
Brig. Gen. William H. Brandenburg, Jr.
16 August 1998 – 21 June 1999
Brig. Gen. Stephen M. Speakes
21 June 1999 – 11 August 2000
Brig. Gen. Randal M. Tieszen
11 August 2000 – 2 August 2001
Brig. Gen. Kenneth J. Quinlan
27 August 2001 -

Units Commanded By V Corps

This list includes divisions and regimental maneuver units assigned to V Corps control. During wartime, the corps commanded an average of three to five divisions at any one time. Army and field army orders often shifted divisions among corps, in response to the prevailing tactical situation. The normal Cold War era organization was one armored division, one mechanized infantry division, and one armored cavalry regiment. Changes in V Corps organization at the end of the Cold War resulted from deployments of units to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and from reorganization incident to the drawdown of the Army. V Corps has always had a Corps Artillery organization assigned, and has also commanded a wide range of supporting arms and services of regimental, brigade, and smaller-sized units.

World War I, 1918-1919

1st Infantry Division ("The Big Red One")
2nd Infantry Division ("Indianhead")
3rd Infantry Division ("Marne Division")
4th Infantry Division ("Ivy Division")
26th Infantry Division ("Yankee")
32nd Infantry Division ("Red Arrow")
33rd Infantry Division
42nd Infantry Division ("Rainbow")
77th Infantry Division ("Statue of Liberty")
79th Infantry Division ("Lorraine")
89th Infantry Division ("Middle West")
91st Infantry Division ("Wild West")
15th (French) Colonial Infantry Division

Interwar years, 1922-1924 (Organized Reserve Headquarters)

5th Infantry Division ("Red Diamond")
(Regular Army, Inactive)
37th Infantry Division ("Buckeye")
38th Infantry Division ("Cyclone")

Interwar years, 1940-1941

32nd Infantry Division ("Red Arrow")
34th Infantry Division ("Red Bull")
37th Infantry Division ("Buckeye")
38th Infantry Division ("Cyclone")
106th Cavalry Regiment

World War II, 1941-1946

1st Infantry Division ("The Big Red One")
2nd Infantry Division ("Indianhead")
4th Infantry Division ("Ivy Division")
5th Infantry Division ("Red Diamond")
8th Infantry Division ("Pathfinder")
9th Infantry Division ("Old Reliables")
28th Infantry Division ("Keystone")
29th Infantry Division ("Blue and Gray")
30th Infantry Division ("Old Hickory")
35th Infantry Division ("Santa Fe")
69th Infantry Division
78th Infantry Division ("Lightning")
80th Infantry Division ("Blue Ridge")
82nd Airborne Division ("All American")
90th Infantry Division ("Tough 'Ombres")
97th Infantry Division
99th Infantry Division
106th Infantry Division
2nd Armored Division ("Hell on Wheels")
3rd Armored Division ("Spearhead")
5th Armored Division ("Victory")
7th Armored Division ("Lucky Seventh")
9th Armored Division ("Remagen")
16th Armored Division
102nd Cavalry Group (Mechanized)
2nd (French) Armored Division

Fort Bragg, 1946-1951

82nd Airborne Division ("All American")

Cold War, 1951-1990

1st Infantry Division ("Big Red One")
4th Infantry Division ("Ivy Division")
8th Infantry Division ("Pathfinder")
10th Infantry Division
2nd Armored Division ("Hell on Wheels")
3rd Armored Division ("Spearhead")
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
("The Blackhorse Regiment")
14th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Post-Cold War, 1990-present

1st Infantry Division ("Big Red One")
3rd Infantry Division ("Marne Division")
8th Infantry Division ("Pathfinder")
1st Armored Division ("Old Ironsides")
3rd Armored Division ("Spearhead")
2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment
("Second Dragoons")
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
("The Blackhorse Regiment")
5th (German) Panzer Division
(in the Bi-National Corps)
13th (German) Panzer Division
(in the Bi-National Corps)

V Corps Order of Battle, 1990

Order of Battle at the end of the Cold War, 1990

23 Maneuver Battalions and Squadrons
10 Battalions General Support and General Support Reinforcing Artillery

3rd Armored Division
Headquarters & Headquarters Company
1st Brigade
2/36th Infantry
3/36 Infantry
2/32nd Armor
4/32nd Armor
2nd Brigade
1/48th Infantry
3/8th Cavalry
4/8th Cavalry
3rd Brigade
1/36 Infantry
2/67th Armor
4/67th Armor
Aviation Brigade
3/12th Cavalry
2/227th Attack Helicopter
3/227th Attack Helicopter
H/227th Combat Aviation Company
G/227th General Support Company
Division Artillery
2/3rd Field Artillery
4/82nd Field Artillery
F/333rd Field Artillery Target Acquisition Battery
A/40th Field Artillery (Multiple Launch Rocket System)
Division Support Command
45th Forward Support Battalion
54th Forward Support Battalion
503rd Forward Support Battalion
122nd Main Support Battalion
I/227th TAM
23rd Engineer Battalion
3/5th Air Defense Artillery
143rd Signal Battalion
533rd MI Battalion
503rd MP Company
22nd Chemical Company

8th Infantry Division (Mechanized)
Headquarters & Headquarters Company
1st Brigade
3/8th Infantry
5/8th Infantry
4/34th Armor
1/68th Armor
2nd Brigade
1/13th Infantry
1/39th Infantry
2/68th Armor
3rd Brigade
4/8th Infantry
3/77th Armor
5/77th Armor
Aviation Brigade
3/7th Cavalry
2/4th Attack Helicopter
3/4th Attack Helicopter
H/4th Combat Aviation Company
G/4th Support Company
Division Support Command
118th Forward Support Battalion
208th Forward Support Battalion
202nd Forward Support Battalion
708th Main Support Battalion
I/4th TAM Company
Division Artillery
6/29th Field Artillery
4/29th Field Artillery (155 mm)
2/29th Field Artillery (155 mm)
C/333rd Field Artillery Target Acquisition Battery
C/16th Artillery (Multiple Launch Rocket System)
12th Engineer Battalion
5/3rd Air Defense Artillery
8th Signal Battalion
108th MI Battalion
8th MP Company
25th Chemical Company

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
1st Squadron
2nd Squadron
3rd Squadron
4th (Aviation) Squadron
Support Squadron

V Corps Artillery
Headquarters & Headquarters Battery
41st Field Artillery Brigade
1/32nd Field Artillery (Lance)
4/18th Field Artillery (8-inch)
4/77th Field Artillery (8-inch)
2/75th Field Artillery (155 mm)
1/27th Field Artillery (Multiple Launch Rocket System)
42nd Field Artillery Brigade
2/32nd Field Artillery (Lance)
3/32nd Field Artillery (Lance)
5/3rd Field Artillery (8-inch)
2/20th Field Artillery (8-inch)
4/7th Field Artillery (8-inch)

3rd Corps Support Command
16th Support Group
8th Maintenance Battalion
19th Maintenance Battalion
85th Maintenance Battalion
142nd Supply and Services Battalion
68th Medical Group
Special Troops Battalion
181st Transportation Battalion
15th Ordnance Battalion
8/158th Aviation (Aviation Intermediate Maintenance)

12th Aviation Brigade
5/6th Cavalry
5/158th Aviation

18th Military Police Brigade
709th MP Battalion
93rd MP Battalion

22nd Signal Brigade
17th Signal Battalion
32nd Signal Battalion
440th Signal Battalion

130th Engineer Brigade
54th Combat Engineer Battalion
317th Combat Engineer Battalion
547th Combat Engineer Battalion
568th Engineer Company (Combat Support Equipment)
814th Engineer Company (Assault Float Bridge)
516th Engineer Company (Medium Girder Bridge)
8591st Civil Support Group (attached)

205th Military Intelligence Brigade
1st MI Battalion (Aerial Exploitation)
165th MI Battalion (TEB HVY)
302nd MI Battalion (CEWI)

5th Personnel Group
52nd Personnel Services Company
55th Personnel Services Company
177th Personnel Services Company
178th Personnel Services Company
198th Personnel Services Company
258th Personnel Services Company
259th Personnel Services Company
261st Personnel Services Company
368th Personnel Services Company
378th Personnel Services Company
257th Personnel Services Company
400th Personnel Services Company
520th Personnel Services Company
569th Personnel Services Company
574th Personnel Services Company
575th Personnel Services Company
64th Replacement Detachment

5th Finance Group
3rd Finance Services Unit
8th Finance Services Unit
14th Finance Services Unit
17th Finance Services Unit
22nd Finance Services Unit
39th Finance Services Unit
78th Finance Services Unit
105th Finance Services Unit
106th Finance Services Unit
117th Finance Services Unit
201st Finance Services Unit
501st Finance Services Unit
503rd Finance Services Unit

Special Troops Battalion (Provisional)

Band

V Corps Order of Battle, 2000

Order of Battle, 2000

14 Maneuver Battalions and Squadrons
6 Maneuver Battalions and Squadrons stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas
1 Battalion General Support and General Support Reinforcing Artillery

1st Armored Division
Headquarters & Headquarters Company
1st Brigade
1-36th Infantry
1-37th Armor
2-37th Armor
2nd Brigade
1/6th Infantry
2/6th Infantry
1/35th Armor
3rd Brigade (Stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas)
1/41st Infantry
1/13th Armor
2/70th Armor
4th (Aviation) Brigade
1/501th Aviation (Attack)
2/501th Aviation
Division Artillery
2/3rd Field Artillery
4/1st Field Artillery
4/27th Field Artillery
C/333rd Field Artillery Target Acquisition Battery
A/94th Field Artillery (Multiple Launch Rocket System)
Division Support Command
501st Forward Support Battalion
47th Forward Support Battalion
125th Forward Support Battalion
123rd Main Support Battalion
127th DASB
Engineer Brigade
16th Engineer Battalion
40th Engineer Battalion
70th Engineer Battalion (Located at Fort Riley, Kansas)
1/1st Cavalry
1/4th Air Defense Artillery (Bradley/Avenger)
501st Military Intelligence Battalion
141st Signal Batalion
501st Military Police Company
69th Chemical Company
Band

1st Infantry Division (Mechanized)
Headquarters & Headquarters Company
1st Brigade (Stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas)
1/16th Infantry
1/34th Armor
2/34th Armor
2nd Brigade
1/18th Infantry
1/26th Infantry
1/77th Armor
3rd Brigade
2/2nd Infantry
1/63rd Armor
2/63rd Armor
4th (Aviation) Brigade
1/1st Aviation (Attack)
2/1st Aviation
Division Artillery
1/7th Field Artillery
1/5th Field Artillery
1/6th Field Artillery
1/33rd Field Artillery
Engineer Brigade
9th Engineer Battalion
1st Engineer Battalion (Located at Fort Riley, Kansas)
82nd Engineer Battalion
Division Support Command
1st Forward Support Battalion
201st Forward Support Battalion
701st Main Support Battalion
601st DASB
1/4th Cavalry
4/3rd Air Defense Artillery (Bradley/Avenger)
101st Military Intelligence Battalion
121st Signal Battalion
1st Military Police Company
12th Signal Company
Band

V Corps Artillery
Headquarters & Headquarters Battery
41st Field Artillery Brigade
1/27th Field Artillery (Multiple Launch Rocket System)

3rd Corps Support Command
16th Corps Support Group
18th Corps Support Battalion
485th Corps Support Battalion
7th Corps Support Group
71st Corps Support Battalion
7/159th Aviation (Aviation Intermediate Maintenance)
181st Transportation Battalion
19th Corps Materiel Management Center
27th Transportation Battalion
Special Troops Battalion

11th Aviation Regiment1
2/6th Cavalry
6/6th Cavalry

12th Aviation Brigade
5/158th Aviation
3/58th Aviation
F/159th Aviation

18th Military Police Brigade
709th MP Battalion
793rd MP Battalion

22nd Signal Brigade
17th Signal Battalion
32nd Signal Battalion
440th Signal Battalion

30th Medical Brigade
93rd Medical Battalion (DS)
226th Medical Battalion (Log)
421st Medical Battalion (Evac)
67th Combat Support Hospital
212th Surgical Hospital
100th Medical Detachment (Vet HQ)
79th Medical Detachment (Vet Small)
21st Medical Detachment (Vet Small)
72nd Medical Detachment (Vet Svc)
64th Medical Detachment (Vet Svc)
51st Medical Detachment (Vet Medicine)

69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade
5/7th ADA (Patriot)
6/52nd ADA (Patriot)

130th Engineer Brigade
94th Engineer Battalion (Construction)
54th Engineer Battalion
565th Engineer Battalion

205th Military Intelligence Brigade
1st MI Battalion (Aerial Exploitation)
165th MI Battalion (TE)
302nd MI Battalion (Operations)

Special Troops Battalion (Provisional)

Band

617th Air Support Operations Group (USAF)

1 This unit is usually referred to, although incorrectly, as the "11th Aviation Regiment." By MTOE, it is an aviation group and is so known by HQ, DA.

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